upa-admin 31 Mayıs 2024 234 Okunma 0

To best evaluate Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China following his fifth-time election as the President of Russia in March 2024, how Moscow and Beijing see the relations between each other should be put forward.[1]

Since the 1990s and primarily in the 2000s, Russia and China have been attaching special prominences to develop bilateral relations. Contrary to the overabundance of “tactical collaborations”, both Russia and China have acknowledged occurring along with the (nowadays non-operational) German-Russia and EU-Russia “tactical collaboration”, the cooperation between Russia and China allows two unique structures: It does undeniably enjoy a calculated eminence, also it stands, from the viewpoint of both co-signers, focused contrary to the United States. The “tactical corporation” can stand supposed to precede 1996. To bear in mind, the extended economic, political, cultural, and security strategy scopes and established arrangements of collaboration, the association stood retitled an “all-inclusive tactical cooperation” by 2011.

The “pivot” post-2014 has individually fast-tracked progress that had commenced twenty years previously.[2] As Russia and China have reinforced relationships, predominantly with the announcement of a corporation heading for tactical coalition within the twenty-first century, there has been an upward gratitude that the long mistreated ‘Asian leg’ of Russian foreign policy has been gaining importance. Notwithstanding this, the attention has stood exactly on the Sino-Russian affiliation, instead of on Russia and Japan, or Russia and Asia further extensively. Russian experts commonly offer ‘expectant’ accounts, and this inclination has been reinforced under Putin. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, Russian scholarship on Russia-China relationships had repeatedly stayed further hysterical – specifically vis-à-vis the Russian Far East and questions about regional delineation, Chinese migration, and cross-border trade, dazzling material security uncertainties as the Sino-Russian border unlocked.

Meanwhile, with the beginning of the Ukraine confrontation in 2014, Russia has deepened its collaboration with China in an ostensible ‘pivot’ to Asia. Nevertheless, even though this stands offered in both Russia and the West as an abrupt one, the wide-ranging setting displays that this remains further a steady recalibration that has been happening on numerous terms. This has to remain observed within the milieu of the U.S. pivot, or ‘rebalancing’, to Asia under Obama, as well as under the delicate bombast succeeding the Ukraine crisis by 2014. It can be concluded that the strengthening of relationships stands comparatively intended to yield a response from the West and to underline the risks of detaching Russia. A firm ‘echoing’ of U.S. linguistics remains manifest – this plays a performative role – that factual excessive powers (to mean the U.S., Russia) stand able to project power outward and perform more than one area instantaneously. Under this context, Russia stands not ‘only one of the BRICS’, i.e. chiefly provincial powers and ‘not-quite’ worldwide powers, but somewhat a state that is capable of acting both provincially and internationally, evenly balanced with the U.S.

Is there certainly an axis? The Russian line to China stands extensively understood as an original, further obliging case: the economic effect of sanctions and a dropping oil charge have required Russia to produce economic spots for China.[3] When we examine some statements regarding this issue, we can see it. The following ones belong to this phenomenon. Russian side evaluates its relations with China as: “Both sides have written into their agreements that their refusal to form a formal alliance displays their “unwillingness to use their bilateral relations against third parties. If allied relations imply a military alliance, then neither Russia nor China are planning to set up such an alliance. But if allied relations are interpreted as joint efforts to defend international law and the fundamentals of the world order built on the United Nations Charter, to counter attempts at meddling with the domestic affairs of other nations, the more so with the use of force, then, yes, we are unconditional allies with China in defending these principles, – We are also allies on the issues that require reaction in the sphere of the global economy where, in violation of the World Trade Organisation’s regulations, the rules of the so-called free market, methods of openly unfair, I would say, “dirty” competition are being used, and there are a lot of examples to that”.[4]

In line with these statements, the Chinese point of view on its relations with the Russian Federation can be summarized as: “China and Russia have walked hand in hand through the past seven decades, each as the other’s largest neighbor. Our comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination is mature, stable, and solid, enjoying the highest level of mutual trust and coordination and the highest strategic value. China has always prioritized its relations with Russia in its diplomatic agenda. China will work with Russia to build a deeper friendship between our two countries, support each other on issues concerning our core interests, closely coordinate with each other on major issues of mutual concern, enhance the connectivity of our development strategies, and push our bilateral relations to greater heights, wider fields, and deeper levels. A close partnership between China and Russia contributes to world peace, security and stability”.[5]

It can additionally remain demonstrated vis-à-vis how Moscow and Beijing stand in evaluating their mutual relationships within the 21st century. Following this topic, it should be looked at the “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development” which was printed on 4 February 2022. As stated by this text, the Moscow-Beijing relationships stand well-defined as: “The sides call for the establishment of a new kind of relationships between world powers based on mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and mutually beneficial cooperation. New inter-state relations between Russia and China are superior to the political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no” forbidden “areas of cooperation, strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries…” [6]

It ought to correspondingly scrutinize the newest foreign strategy notion of the Russian Federation which was declared on 31 March 2023. As stated by this document, the foremost foreign strategy marked in the direction of China by Russia can stand set forth as: “The People’s Republic of China: 51. A comprehensive deepening of ties and enhancement of coordination with friendly sovereign global centers of power and development, which are located on the Eurasian continent and committed to approaches which coincide in principle with the Russian approaches to future world order and solutions for key problems of the world politics, is particularly important for achieving strategic goals and major objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. 52. Russia aims at further strengthening the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and focuses on the development of mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas, provision of mutual assistance, and enhancement of coordination in the international arena to ensure security, stability and sustainable development at the global and regional levels, both in Eurasia and in other parts of the world.”[7]

Key timeline of China-Russia relationship

Available at:, (Accessed on 24 May 2024).

Regardless of their former dissimilarities, China and Russia presently are pursuing shared purposes, for instance, unsettling U.S. and NATO influence. They discover themselves united contrary to a mutual contender. On March 1, China would be one of the five states that voted counter to quarreling the Russian incursion of Ukraine. It has additionally withheld in the UN General Assembly vote reproachful the incursion. China has similarly abandoned conventional of importation limitations on Russian goods succeeding the assault. It stands palpable that China stands presenting backing for Russia in its assault on Ukraine. Blanchette contends that the inferior effects are going for Putin within Ukraine, further, China will be backing him, to hold Russia as its crucial tactical companion, uniformly at a bigger price. It stands to be expected that Beijing deliberates the likelihood of a Russian loss as a risk to its territorial intentions in the Asia-Pacific region, where it stays in a geopolitical contention with the US. Consequently, an expanding China might make available robust assistance to Russia in holding a picket in Ukraine in the extensive course. Xi Jinping has even now heightened his collaboration with Putin, supportive of Russia in its military operation within Ukraine. Putin, sponsored by a bigger power, will stand well capable of fuse backing for his warfare within Ukraine, as well as afterward, for his rule’s persistence.

An additional probable consequence is that the interchange between China and Russia might end up with a universalization of Chinese money within Russia. Putin and Xi Jinping have, increasingly (following the economic sanctions on Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine), commenced to contemplate the practice of their nationwide money in two-sided expenditures to remain the enduring technique of business. In this method, the Kremlin is supposed to stand a smaller amount impacted by the U.S.-run economic sanctions. Alternatively, in its most new Five-Year Plan, Beijing has publicized its vibrant purpose of forming further progressive yuan cross-border payment systems, to back their currency’s universalization. The de-dollarization arrangements have even now remained ongoing in mutual commercial activities amid Russia and China, via substituting the dollar with the euro. Nevertheless, the exercise of swapping to the euro has stayed freshly broken up by European sanctions. To resolve this problem, and to sidestep the SWIFT worldwide payment scheme, China and Russia have begun to exercise their varieties of payment organizations. Furthermore, Putin has commenced to increase the dangers, by requesting roubles for Russian natural gas exportations. It stands very primary to calculate to what degree Putin’s anticipation to reimburse for gas in roubles will govern the route of de-dollarization. Nevertheless, this, and also China’s determination to universalize the Chinese yuan, stand as specific indications that ought to be considered in terms of adding up the forthcoming path of the China and Russia interaction.[8]

China’s Xi Jinping and Russia’s Vladimir Putin on 16 May 2024 would initiate a “brand-new age” of association amid the two most commanding contenders of the United States, which they declare as a belligerent Cold War hegemon disseminating disorder athwart the world.[9] Xi, 70, and Putin, 71, have inked a mutual declaration on that date concerning the “brand-new age” that asserted disapproval of the U.S. concerning a congregation of security questions and a collective understanding regarding everything ranging from Taiwan and Ukraine to North Korea and collaboration over original non-violent nuclear know-how and finance.[10] Xi has underlined that “The China-Russia relationship today is hard-earned, and the two sides need to cherish and nurture it. “China is willing to … jointly achieve the development and rejuvenation of our respective countries, and work together to uphold fairness and justice in the world.” Xi has similarly discoursed Putin that the two hold the opportunity to turn into the leaders of transformation within the world that has not been experienced in a century, which numerous specialists do observe as an endeavor for confronting the global order led by Washington. The mutual declaration has been defined as the further consolidation of tactical relations as well as declared strategies for accelerating military connections accompanied by the collaboration in defense areas amid the two states have been strengthening local as well as universal security. The joint statement has underlined the fact that “The United States still thinks in terms of the Cold War and is guided by the logic of bloc confrontation, putting the security of ‘narrow groups’ above regional security and stability, which creates a security threat for all countries in the region. The U.S. must abandon this behavior.” It has correspondingly fated enterprises to take hold of properties and possessions of external states, a pure position to Western transfers to forward earnings from solid Russian possessions or the resources themselves, to aid Ukraine.

Putin has celebrated the progress in two-sided commerce while exploring a China-Russia Expo in the northeastern city of Harbin. He would come together with students at the Harbin Institute of Technology, recognized for its defense research and its work with the People’s Liberation Army. Harbin, the capital of China’s Heilongjiang province, has remained on one occasion home-based to numerous Russian emigrants and recollects some of that past in its style, for instance, the central St. Sophia Cathedral, a previous Russian Orthodox church. Emphasizing the individual landscape of the connection, Putin has mentioned at the Harbin Institute and his alma mater, St. Petersburg State University, will be launching a combined school for 1,500 students. He has underlined that “I’m sure that it will become a flagship of the Russian-Chinese cooperation in science and education. The partnership between China and Russia is not directed against anyone. It is aimed at one thing: creating better conditions for the development of our countries and improving the well-being of the people of China and the Russian Federation. Others oppose the Moscow-Beijing relationship, saying an “emerging multipolar world … is now taking shape before our eyes. And it is important that those who are trying to maintain their monopoly on decision-making in the world on all issues … do everything in their power to ensure that this process goes naturally.”[11]

Not only Russia, but also China has commonly articulated the “emerging multipolar world” in answer to what they understand as U.S. hegemony. According to Joseph Torigian, a research fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institute, has underscored that “the message being sent by China and Russia was clear. At this moment, they’re reminding the West that they can be defiant when they want to.” In Washington, White House national security spokesman John Kirby has assessed Russian-Chinese relations as; “It’s “no surprise” that Xi and Putin “continue to try to develop this burgeoning relationship,” but he noted the pair haven’t worked together long and that officials in both governments “aren’t necessarily all that trustful. What they have in common is a desire to challenge the international rules-based order, and challenge the network of alliances and partnerships that the United States enjoys. To try to look for ways to bolster each other’s national security interests as well. the U.S. wasn’t “necessarily surprised” by the Putin-Xi meeting, but the administration was nonetheless concerned and watching closely as the two leaders’ relationship developed. I’ll just tell you that we take seriously the challenges that both countries represent. And we take seriously this burgeoning relationship between the two…”[12]

Taiwan’s outbound Foreign Minister, Joseph Wu has assessed this meeting as follows: “Russia and China are helping each other expand their territorial reach, and democracies must push back against authoritarian states that threaten their rights and sovereignty. democracies to align in countering Russia and China’s military assertiveness in Europe, the South China Sea, and beyond. China threatens to invade Taiwan, a self-ruled democracy that it claims as its territory. In particular, Western powers continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia to send a message that democracies will defend one another. If Ukraine is defeated in the end, I think China is going to get inspired, and they might take even more ambitious steps in expanding their power in the Indo-Pacific, and it will be disastrous for the international community. Tensions in the South China Sea are “more dangerous” than those in the Taiwan Strait, and they indicate China’s ambition to project power in the region. Putin’s visit to Beijing is an example of the two big authoritarian countries supporting each other, working together with each other, supporting each other’s expansionism…”[13]

In another assessment on this issue by the high-ranking officials of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, it has been underlined the following issues:

“Lt Gen. Jeffrey Kruse: Bottom line is that basically if we were to have a conflict with one, the chances are we would have a second front.

Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines: We see China and Russia, for the first time, exercising together with Taiwan and recognizing that this is a place where China wants Russia to be working with them, and we see no reason why they wouldn’t. From the Department of Defense perspective, that would certainly be the case, and it just has to be taken into account whether or not we believe there would be two full-up fronts. That is analysis and assessments that will mature over time…”[14]

Due to Russia’s high-tech objectives, it stands scarcely astonishing that Putin’s thoughts remained seized by the vision of collaborating with China on space search. As stated by the state-run newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Putin has mentioned that he welcomed the impression that Russia and China cooperatively opened out their flags on Mars when he publicized a rover with automatic flag placement know-how. The conversation has helped as a reproof to the European Space Agency, which inserted a combined European-Russian Mars mission in the aftermath of Russia’s incursion of Ukraine, and aligned up with NASA as a substitute. Mars is not the lone emphasis of Russia’s and China’s possible space collaboration. Before this year, the chairman of Russia’s space agency Roscosmos, Yuri Borisov, publicized the details concerning the envisaged China-Russia lunar station, declaring that Russia was aimed at stationing a nuclear power plant on the Moon. As stated by Reuters, the Russian space program has confronted hindrances within previous terms notwithstanding determinations to pit the Earth’s satellite. Its initial lunar mission in almost half a century would fail when the Luna-25 spacecraft stroke into the moon.[15]

Putin has correspondingly shown startling self-confidence in the appearance of China’s predominance as an automobile powerhouse. The only cause why charges stand being presented on EVs in the West, Putin has mentioned, remains that the superiority of Chinese EVs has upgraded. He has stated that Russia salutes the growth of the Chinese automobile industry and articulated expectations in their extra collaboration. This news emanates on the bounders of progressively despairing protests by Russian automakers, under the leadership of state-owned company AvtoVAZ accusing that Chinese products remain monetarily destabilizing Russian manufacturers and hold any attention in terms of focusing their manufacturing within Russia. On the word of the chairman of the Russian-Chinese Committee for Friendship, Peace, and Development, Russian establishments have set forth the subject of localization with their Chinese associates. It stands undecided whether this demand has encountered any type of comeback. In the meantime, Chinese reporting of Putin’s visit has clarified that Beijing’s prospects of collaboration with Moscow regularly rotate around the principal sector. Scripting of relationships between the two states, CCTV lessened Russia-China commerce to Russian gas in Chinese households, and Chinese electronics and cars on Russian roads.[16]

Undeniably, one of the most important news within the Global Times throughout the time of Putin’s visit was the declaration of Russia’s primary marine terminal within the Far East for the delivery of liquefied petroleum gas. As stated by one Chinese expert questioned by the Global Times, momentous advances stand anticipated not only within energy and manufacturing but also in terms of agriculture. On the word of the passage, negotiations have been apprehended among agricultural specialists from the two states on the probability of Russia’s turning out to be a foremost soybean provider to China. At present, China’s soybean importations stand subjugated by Brazil (70 percent) and the United States (24 percent), nevertheless Russia’s climate transforms it into a perfect contender for raising the crop. It stands expected that Russian agricultural exportations might decrease Chinese dependence on foodstuffs originating from the United States, due to ever-deteriorating political stiffnesses. There stand, unquestionably, additional conducts wherein Russian and Chinese benefits congregate. Collaboration in terms of enabling fiscal dealings might bring a foremost triumph to Beijing, as Chinese specialists assume Moscow to make available additional provisions for the universalization of the renminbi. Russian anticipations to cooperatively progress its Far East have correspondingly acknowledged the interest of the Chinese press, accompanied by gigantic volumes of natural deposits coming up for extraction and use.[17]

After the recent visit of Putin to China in the middle of May 2024, the energy cooperation between Moscow and Beijing has been evaluated by Putin as follows: “Has an agreement in principle been reached on the Power of Siberia 2 project? When will construction start: this year or next year? Have there been any talks about a possible increase in supplies? Vladimir Putin: Yes. I am not ready to speak about technical details now, but both sides have confirmed their interest in implementing these projects. Since the Chinese economy is growing, it requires, accordingly, more energy resources needed to maintain this growth. Nothing is more reliable (I think this is clear) than supplies from Russia. We have a huge common border, and no one will interfere here: neither sanctions against the tanker fleet, nor even sanctions against financial institutions. We will buy and sell everything in national currencies. Therefore, the interest on both sides has been reaffirmed. On the one hand, there is interest in receiving additional volumes, on the other hand, there is interest in selling on the Chinese market. This is always a complicated process, involving the question of prices, the question of who will earn, and how much. However, strategically we are interested, in both countries, in implementing these projects, and we will move forward with them. Gazprom and our oil companies will certainly come to terms. There are different routes. One of them runs via Mongolia, and both gas and oil pipelines can be laid in the same corridor. Specialists will have to decide how best to proceed. It is possible to use the Northern Sea Route. We can buy extra tankers and set up supplies via the Northern Sea Route, which is almost the same as the pipeline. All these alternatives are possible, acceptable, and economically expedient. It is necessary to choose the best ones. I am confident that this work will be completed as well.”[18]


Within the context of current international relations in the 21st century, one of the most significant relations that is closely followed by the world in general is the association between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Even if they have been experiencing some problems such as border disputes and their diverse views on approaching Central Asia, both Moscow and Beijing have been trying to overcome their differences. They are now concentrating on widening the scope of their bilateral relations and are defining their bilateral relations as a “limitless partnership”.

Not only Beijing but also Moscow are the leading proponents of the multipolar world order which stands directly counter to the unipolar world advocated by the United States of America. Also in that context, they jointly follow very similar policies in international relations issues such as Syria, Ukraine, and so on. China has also been criticizing Euro-Atlantic sanctions on Russia due to its Ukraine policies. In that sense, China is underestimating the Western sanctions and is focusing on expanding the coverage areas of bilateral relations with Russia. On the other hand, Russia which has been experiencing comprehensive sanctions implemented by the Euro-Atlantic Bloc since 2014 owing to its Ukraine policies is unable to reach as well as attract the Western capital and know-how for its country. Therefore, because of the proximity of China to Russia and vice versa, accompanied by China’s growing energy need, we can see the interdependence in the bilateral relations. Because Russia needs reliable energy buyers and China necessitates reliable energy sellers. One should also consider the fact that China is increasingly afraid of the Malacca Dilemma which can be described as in the case of the Beijing and Washington confrontation on the Taiwan Question, the Malacca Strait which 1/3 of the energy supply to China passes might be interrupted by the possible U.S. intervention. Thus, China has ever been attaching sui generis importance to the continuous flows of energy into its country in order to sustain its socio-economic development. Russia always needs new markets to send its oil and natural gas as well as its other energy commodities to sustain its socio-economic development. By considering these issues, they have been working to advance their energy relations such as the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean Oil Pipeline, Power of Siberia 1-2 Natural Gas Pipeline, and Arctic LNG Projects. China and Russia are also advancing their relations in the nuclear energy field. They are determined to expand their relations in other industrial fields.

One of the most important issues between Russia and China is the development of bilateral military relations. The arms trade between these countries is increasing day by day. Also, they are concentrating on the expansion and the influence of such international institutional mechanisms namely Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS+ (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa). Another one of the most important issues between Beijing and Moscow stands the “dedollarization”. For a couple of years, Moscow and Beijing have realized their bilateral commercial relationships with their currencies namely Rubble and Yuan. According to the latest explanations, more than 90 percent of bilateral trade relations between these two countries are done with Yuan and Rubble.[19]

To conclude even if the ever-close relationship between Russia and China is criticized by the Western world and for instance, China is criticized for the sponsorship of Russia’s special military operation to Ukraine by the Euro-Atlantic Bloc[20], both Putin and Xi are not listening to these criticisms and they are trying to expand the scopes of their bilateral relations day by day. In that context, when their insistence on the multipolar world order against the unipolar world order is taken into consideration, they possibly will continue their close collaborations in the near and longer term despite the increasing criticisms originally coming from the Euro-Atlantic Bloc.

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[1] Abdullah Cinkara, “Değişen Dünya Düzeninde Rusya ve Çin”, IJESOS International Journal of Educational and Social Sciences, Volume: 3, Number: 1, 2024, pp. 26-36.

[2] Hannes Adomeit, “Russia’s Strategic Outlook and Policies: What Role for China?”, in Russia-China Relations Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals?, Editors: Sarah Kirchberger & Svenja Sinjen & Nils Wörmer, Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022, p. 20.

[3] Natasha Kuhrt, “Chapter 15: Asia-Pacific and China”, in Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy, Edited by Andrei P. Tsygankov, New York: Routledge, 2018, pp. 255-256.

[4] Sina Kısacık, “Power of Siberia Natural Gas Pipelines and The Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Plant as the Most Concrete Show of Strengths by Russia-China Duo within the 21st Century”, E&S 2023a 9th Eurasian Conference on Economics and Social Sciences hosted by Cyprus Science University, Kyrenia, TRNC May 5 – 7, 2023, Tam Metin Bildiriler Kitabı/Proceedings Book, e-ISBN 978-605-71963-7-8 E-printed in May 2023, pp. 642-655, p.644.

[5] Kısacık, “Power of Siberia Natural Gas Pipelines and The Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Plant as the Most Concrete Show of Strengths by Russia-China Duo within the 21st Century”, p. 645.

[6] Kısacık, “Power of Siberia Natural Gas Pipelines and The Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Plant As The Most Concrete Show of Strengths By Russia-China Duo Within The 21st Century”, p. 645.

[7] Kısacık, “Power of Siberia Natural Gas Pipelines and The Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas Plant As The Most Concrete Show of Strengths By Russia-China Duo Within The 21st Century”, p. 645.

[8] Adil Yıldız, “The Rise of China and its Interplay with the Russian and Turkish Regimes”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume: 20, Number 79, 2023, pp. 61-62, Available at:

[9] Hüseyin Korkmaz, “Doğu İttifaki Güçleniyor mu?”, Türk Asya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (TASAM), Date of Publication, 23 May 2024, Available at: Https://Tasam.Org/Tr-Tr/Icerik/72591/Dogu_Ittifaki_Gucleniyor_Mu_, (Accessed on 31 May 2024).

[10] Bernard Orr & Guy Faulconbridge & Andrew Osborn, “Putin and Xi pledge a new era and condemn the United States”, Reuters: World, Date of Publication: 17 May 2024, Available at: , (Accessed on 23 May 2024).

[11]  Huizhong Wu & Emily Wang Fujiyama, “Putin concludes a trip to China by emphasizing its strategic and personal ties to Russia”, The Associated Press (AP): World News, Date of Publication: 18 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 23 May 2024).

[12] Julia Mueller, “Kirby on Putin-Xi hug: ‘That’s nice for them’”, The Hill: Administration, Date of Publication: 17 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 24 May 2024);, (Accessed on 24 May 2024).

[13] Simina Mistreanu & Christopher Bodeen, “Taiwan’s foreign minister says China and Russia are supporting each other’s ‘expansionism’”, The Associated Press (AP): World News, Date of Publication: 17 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 24 May 2024).

[14] Micah McCartney, “Taiwan Issued Dire Warning About Russia-China Dual Threat”, Newsweek, Date of Publication: 03 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 24 May 2024).

[15] Ladislav Charouz, “Putin’s China Visit: As Moscow Eyes Mars, Beijing Wants Beans”, The Diplomat: China Power/Diplomacy/East Asia, Date of Publication: 21 May 2024, Available at: , (Accessed on 23 May 2024).

[16] The President of Russia, “Answers to media questions following the visit to China”, Date of Publication: 17 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 24 May 2024).



[19] Mauro Ramos, “Global South considers increasing de-dollarization, but Trump wants to punish those who reduce dependence on US currency”, Brasil de Fato, Date of Publication: 29 May 2024, Available at:, (Accessed on 31 May 2024).

[20] Finbarr Bermingham, “British defence minister says China plans to provide Russia with ‘lethal aid’ for Ukraine war”, South China Morning Post (SCMP): China /Military, Date of Publication: 23 May 2024, Available at:,  (Accessed on 30 May 2024).

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