NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA OR NOT?

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NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: ETHNIC SECURITY DILEMMA OR NOT?

Introduction

The collapse of imperial regimes can be profitably viewed as a problem of emerging anarchy.[1] The weakening and later absence of the central state (USSR) as the sovereign in the Caucasus, resulted in a new situation in the region as in other parts of the USSR. In this study, the concentrations will be focused on the Caucasus region, particularly on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that resulted with human tragedy, losses of lives and overall instability in the region. There are lots of researches about this conflict and they are being continued to become more, parallel with the time of the unsolved conflict passes.

When Russian empire collapsed, three states emerged in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) and existed till the establishment of Soviet rule. When Soviets established in the region, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was brought to plenum of  Kavbureau CC RCP(b) (Caucasus  Bureau  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party  of  the Bolsheviks). The Kavbureau decided that Nagorno-Karabakh should be left within the boundaries of the Soviet Azerbaijan on 5 July 1921.[2] The administrative borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (hereinafter – NKAO) were defined in a way to ensure that the Armenian population constituted a majority. According to the 1989 census, Nagorno-Karabakh’s population was approximately 75 percent ethnic Armenian (145,000) and 25 percent ethnic Azerbaijanis (40,688).[3] After the collapse of the Soviet Union the situation became tragic and resulted with large scale war between two newly independent states. At first times there were skirmishes then it passed into a full scale war in battlefield. On 12 May 1994, the warring parties agreed to sign Bishkek ceasefire protocol that brokered by Russia. In the study I will not analyse the period of war that much because it is not such related with the theory of ethnic conflict. I will refer to it when the concentrations will be focused on earlier period of conflict which directly relates with the theory.

The research question of the study is to find out whether Nagorno-Karabakh conflict occurred as a result of the ethnic security dilemma or not? In order to find out I will analyse:

– The reasons regarding escalation of conflict and demands of the minority group at that time.

It is important to assess the intentions that come from the central state to the group. One of the essential concepts of the security dilemma is “uncertainty”. Thus, if there is obvious malign intent to the group from the central state, the driving force can be accepted as aggression rather than a security dilemma. So I will analyse the reasons regarding escalation of conflict. The flow of events after the decline of USSR and later when Azerbaijan got its independence is crucial, bearing in mind the fact that policies of the state cause action-reaction with minority-group and also a security dilemma. The position of the minority group is also important. It will be analysed that what was the desire and demands of the minority group when the conflict escalated.

– Socio-economic situation in NKAO

Social and economic situation is an important factor that must be examined because changes in access to or control over economic resources can also cause ethnic conflict. It will be analysed whether there were any economic discriminations against Armenians in NKAO that caused grievances and escalated the conflict. It is possible for the group to be supressed by the central state because of their identity (ethnic, cultural, religious, and national). The means of these actions can be varied as banning or restricting minority group’s language and degrading their economic situation. The comparison of economic situation in NKAO and overall in Azerbaijan SRR is useful in that context. As it was an autonomous oblast inside Azerbaijan SSR, it had specific cultural, religious and linguistic rights for ethnic minorities. According to the Constitution of the USSR, NKAO was represented by 5 MPs in the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was also represented by 12 MPs in the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR.

For doing the research I will do content analyses using books, including international authors for not being biased, articles dedicated to this topic, statements of officials, news archives and other relevant sources.

Ethnic Security Dilemma

The concept of ‘Security Dilemma’ emerges from the school of neorealist theory of international relations. As the international system is anarchic from the perspective of neorealist theory, this situation causes states to feel themselves being in a position, as worrying about their security. John Herz was the first who used the term “security dilemma” in the literature of international relations with his study of ‘Political Realism and Political Idealism’ written in 1951. Herbert Butterfield, a British historian also described the same situation in different manner as “absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma”.[4] Although it can be said that as a term the security dilemma is relatively new but the historians such as Xenophon and Thucydides described kinds of situations among political units as in security dilemma.[5] In later period, Robert Jervis examined security dilemma in his monograph, (Perception and Misperception in International Politics). In his article R. Jervis mentioned and differentiated spiral and deterrence models of the security dilemma. While in deterrence model the centre of attention is adversaries’ intentions, in spiral model the concentrations focuses on anarchic nature of international relations.[6] The essential concept of security dilemma is a situation where one state uses means to increase its security which in turn causes insecurity for others.

Intra-state ethnic conflicts emerged after the end of Cold War as a result of the collapse of USSR and Eastern Bloc (Central and Eastern Europe). At that time, Barry Posen was the first who applied the concept of security dilemma to intra-state level in his study The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict. ‘The absence of a sovereign’ results with anarchy leaving in their wake a host of groups – ethnic, religious, cultural – of greater or lesser cohesion.[7] Anarchical structure plays an important role for the condition of security dilemma in ethnic conflicts and when the independent groups face with that kind situation, they use the history as a tool to assess whether another is a threat or not.[8] B. Posen argues that the conditions for security dilemma in the intra-state level are as follows:

  • The indistinguishability of offence and defence,
  • The superiority of offensive over defensive action,
  • Windows of vulnerability and opportunity.

The factors mentioned above are crucial for referring the situation as security dilemma in the ethnic conflict. The arguable side of B. Posen’s study is related with the central state’s intention to the group. When he operationalize the theory in the case of Croats and Serbs, he argues that each side not only had to assess the other’s capabilities, but also its intentions, and there were plenty of signals of malign intent. B. Posen’s argument of “malign intention” is not in line with the key element of security dilemma because according to the founders of this concept – J. Herz and H. Butterfield, “uncertainty” is a core concept of a security dilemma. The existence of malign intent creates a real incompatibility that ensures the defensive actions being taken by the target state/group are not self-defeating or paradoxical.[9] In security dilemma, misperception must drive the actions rather than obvious malign intent. B. Posen’s approach to operationalize security dilemma to intrastate level is the first and useful in the literature of international relations.

In order to get thoroughly acquainted with application of security dilemma to intrastate level it will be helpful and useful to refer to the other scholars’ work in this context. In his article (The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?), Paul Roe accepts the occurrence of a security dilemma as ‘when two parties, neither wishing to harm the other, end up going to war’.[10] As B. Posen, he also argues that anarchy in itself is not the cause of worst-case assumptions rather it provides necessary conditions in which this can take place. Uncertainty of the others’ intentions is also the key element of security dilemma in his work. P. Roe categorised the concept of security dilemma as “Tight”, “Regular” and “Loose”. The description of the required conditions for ‘tight’ security dilemma refers to a situation when to actors with compatible security requirements misperceive the nature of their relationship and thus employ countermeasures based on an illusory incompatibility.[11] He refers to the work of Kenneth Boulding who differentiated two different kinds of incompatibility as ‘real’ and ‘illusory’. The distinction between them is very important and K. Boulding defines ‘real incompatibility’- where we have two images of the future in which realization of one would prevent realization of the other and ‘illusory incompatibility’- in which there exists a condition of compatibility which would satisfy the ‘real’ interests of the parties but in which the dynamics of the situation or illusions of the parties create a situation of misunderstanding.[12] Such a distinction is more accountable to operationalize the theory on ethnic conflicts compared to benign/malign intentions because intention and outcome can be varied vastly. In his categorization, according to P. Roe, in ‘regular’ security dilemma security-seekers act more in accordance with a real incompatibility resulting from their incompatible security requirements, implying the fact that regular security dilemmas are not marked by ‘misperception’ as in tight ones. When it comes to his last category of ‘loose’ security dilemma, here it is not obvious that whether the actors are security-seekers is inconsequential.[13] Bearing in mind the variation and complexity of ethnic conflicts, the division of security dilemma as given above is useful but on the other hand ‘’regular’ and ‘loose’ type of security dilemmas are not in line with constitutive elements of the theory as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘misperception’.

Another approach to security dilemma in the context of ethnic conflict is done by Stuart J. Kaufman. His works that related to the issue were set out in two articles, “An ‘international’ theory of inter-ethnic war” and “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War”. He argues that applying the concept of security dilemma to intrastate level is problematic because ethnic groups within a state rarely find themselves in a situation of complete anarchy. In order to solve the problem, he argues that the concept of security dilemma can be applied to a situation, when there is no effective sovereign in the state.[14] He differentiates the forms of security dilemmas in ethnic conflicts, bearing in mind the neorealist view, as structural and perceptual security dilemmas. A structural security dilemma refers to a situation which occurs as a result of anarchic nature of the system whereas a perceptual security dilemma takes place when decision-makers ‘fail to recognize the degree to which their security measures threaten other states.[15] After conceptualization of the two concepts above, he divides ethnic war into mass-led and elite-led case. In mass-led cases, anarchic structure of the system plays an important role and thus it is in line with structural security dilemma whereas in elite-led cases, elites intentionally cause both mass hostility and a security dilemma thus it is in line with perceptual security dilemma. This type of distinction by S. Kaufman is also useful but in perceptual security dilemma, the malign intentions of the elites cause problems regarding uncertainty and misperception conceptions of the security dilemma. As A. Collins argues, if the elite pursue actions intentionally which create a perception of threat amongst the ethnic groups then the security dilemma could explain a consequential deterioration in relations.

Although in some aspects, the scholars’ view differs, but in general they accept the core features of security dilemma unanimously. If we generalize scholars’ approaches to security dilemma, we can see that “misperception” and “uncertainty” are the key elements of the concept. In other words, the actions must be done unintentionally rather than with obvious malign intent.

Escalation of conflict and its causes: (Socio-economic situation in NKAO)

After the establishment of Soviet rule in South Caucasus, Kavbureau (Caucasian Bureau of the Russian CP) appointed a commission for the settlement of the final borders between the Transcaucasian republics.[16] On 5 July 1921, Kavbureau decided to leave the mountainous Karabakh within the boundaries of Soviet Azerbaijan and its administrative borders were drawn in 1923.[17] According to the decision, mountainous Karabakh was declared as an administrative region. Central Executive Committee of Soviet Azerbaijan published a decree regarding the formation of NKAR (Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region) on 7 July 1923. The decree stated: ‘To form, as part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, an Autonomous Armenian Region in Karabakh with Khankendi as its centre’.[18] The Armenian population of NKAO and Armenian SSR have never satisfied with that decision and whenever there was an opportunity, they showed their dissatisfaction with status-quo by addressing letters and petitions to the central Soviet authorities asking incorporation of NKAO to Armenian SSR.

The people of NKAO and authorities of Armenian SSR has sent lots of applications to the central Soviet authorities asking reconsideration of the decision on incorporating Nagorno- Karabakh to Azerbaijan, which were ignored or rejected, causing persecutions against the initiators. Among these applications are the application of the Government and the Communist Party Central Committee of Armenian SSR from 1945 to the Government of the USSR and the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee, more than 2.5 thousand in 1963 and more than 45 thousand signed letters in 1965 from the NKAO population addressed to Soviet leadership, offers of NKAO working groups within the USSR-wide discussions on a new constitution in 1977.[19]

In 1985, Mikhail S. Gorbachev became the General-Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CSPU). M. Gorbachev set out to lead his country out of the “stagnation” of the Brezhnev era and for this purpose he initiated the policies of perestroika (economic restructuring) and glasnost (openness).[20] These reform policies did not achieved its goals rather worsened the overall situation in USSR and consequently played an important role in its dissolution. The period of M. Gorbachev’s era suited well for the demands of minority groups with those reform policies. In August 1987, more than 75.000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and Soviet Armenia signed a petition and sent it to M. Gorbachev making an ardent appeal to ‘’reattach’’ Mountainous Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Socialist Armenia.[21] Initially, the Armenian nationalist movement that emerged in 1987 coalesced around issues related to the republic’s terrible environmental condition.[22] In October 1987, there were demonstrations in Yerevan against environmental issues and also demands regarding the annexation of Nakhichevan and Mountainous Karabakh to Armenia.[23] The same day there was an incident in Chardakli (village in North-western Azerbaijan, just outside borders of NKAO) because the Armenians refuted the nomination of an Azerbaijani to director position of Sovkhoz.[24] In middle of November, Abel Aganbegyan (a senior economic advisor to M. Gorbachev) told that Moscow was willing to treat Armenian demand for unification with Nagorno-Karabakh sympathetically.[25]

The tensions rose in both two countries as a result of demonstrations and it passed into a new phase by removing of one each other out of the country. As S. Cornell notes, after these events the Azerbaijanis in Armenia faced with increasing difficulties and Armenians started driving Azerbaijanis out of Armenia.[26] In January-February 1988, three waves of refugees reached Baku and most of them relocated in Sumgait, in Baku’s industrial suburbs.[27] As the demonstrations continued, the situation came to an irrevocable position when then the Soviet of People’s Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution by a vote of 110-17 requesting the oblast’s transfer to the Armenian SSR on 20 February 1988. The CPSU Central Committee rejected and holds that “the actions and demands directed at revising the existing national and territorial structure contradict the interests of the working people in Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Armenia and damage inter-ethnic relations”. The slogans and banners in demonstrations at the same time in Yerevan were as follows:

– “One nation one republic”

– “Re-establish historic injustice”

– “Karabakh to Armenia”

 – “Armenians! Unite, and Take Karabakh”.[28]

Central Committee’s rejection of the resolution did not calm the situation in Azerbaijan. Crowds of people responded to killing of two Azerbaijani youth on the outskirts of NKAO by further demonstrations.[29] The strict agitation demanding revenge for the two death of Azerbaijanis began in Sumgait on 26 February. It can be accepted as normal because just in January-February 1988, a lot of Azerbaijanis have come to Sumgait from Armenia but according to S. Cornell this line of thought has severe flaws. The following three days (27-29 February) were coloured by hooligans going on rampage, looting Armenian homes, burning houses and haunting for Armenians. The official figures show 32 dead (26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis).[30] On 12 July 1988, the NKAO Soviet of People’s Deputies voted in favour of unilateral secession from Azerbaijan SSR and Supreme Soviet Presidium of Azerbaijan ASRR rejected the move as illegal almost immediately. Three days later, on 15 July 1988, Armenian SSR passed a resolution calling for the USSR Supreme Soviet to approve the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia in accordance with the NKAO’s request of 20 February.[31] According to article 78 of the Soviet constitution, the territory of a union republic may not be altered without its consent. On this ground, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan responded two days later with a resounding rejection of the oblast’s transfer as violation of Soviet constitution.[32] As the confrontations went on central authorities did not take strict measures. The population in both Azerbaijan and Armenia were mobilizing on the grounds of nationality and it was a danger for the central authorities for the existence of the Soviet rule. These events were causing disorder in the two Soviet republics and it could help the central S. Gorbachev administration to handle the situation afterwards as a saviour and enforce the central ruling. Although on 12 January 1988, the decree of the Soviet Presidium endowed the NKAO with a “special administrative status” which put the region under the direct control of a six-person committee answerable to Moscow (Arkadiy Volsky as head of provisional government of the Oblast) and setting free the leadership of the Karabakh Committee did not calm down the demonstrations in Yerevan and NKAO.[33] The Karabakh Committee created National Council that helped to create paramilitary units in NKAO.[34]

The overall situation in NKAO was deteriorating. After the second half of 1989 onwards, skirmishes and shoot-outs between armed bands became the rule rather than the exception.[35] The Soviet direct command in NKAO could not be successful, thus on 28 November 1989 it was abolished. The Armenian Supreme Soviet declared the incorporation of Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenian Republic on 1 December 1989.[36] The acts of reciprocity between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were continued in 1990 in the form of blockades, skirmishes between armed bands and clashes between villagers. Combined Soviet Army forces and Azerbaijani militia units held the operation “Ring” in order to disbandment of unauthorized armed bands according to July 1990 presidential decree. The very first clashes between Azerbaijanis and Armenians were happening in the outskirts of NKAO, north-west of Nagorno- Karabakh. Thus, on 30 April 1991 combined Soviet and Azerbaijani units ringed the villages and started to searching for guerrillas and weapons, often interrogating and beating the inhabitants and arresting arbitrarily the male heads of households.[37] The aim of the operation was to frustrate Armenia’s drive for independence and disbanding illegal armed formations.[38] The further continuation of events showed that the operation “Ring” did not achieved its goal. M. Croissant’s notes that in this operation, for the first time, clashes between armed units of both republics had broken out with the actively participation of Soviet forces and it brought the tensions to a level bordering all-out warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[39] The relations were further deteriorated when an Azerbaijani helicopter (MI-8), carrying high level state officials, was shot down on 20 November 1991 over the NKAO. After one week, on 27 November 1991, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet voted to annul the autonomous legal status of the NKAO and institute direct rule over the oblast via the renamed provincial capital of Hankendi.[40] The role of the Soviet Union is undeniable in both creation of the conflict and not handling it properly but after the dissolution of USSR, there was a quite well situation for a war because the sovereign was absence.

Analysing of economic and social situation in NKAO is useful in order to find out the triggering factors of the conflict. NKAO is a mountainous region and there are good opportunities for tourism, cattle-breeding and etc. In Khankendi (formerly Stepanakert), there was a textile factory. The industrial output was higher in NKAO compared to other regions of Azerbaijan SSR[41]. According to the report submitted by Azerbaijan to Council of Europe, in 1988-1989 academic year, the schools in NKAO were:

– 136 Secondary schools (The language of instruction was in Armenian)

 -13 Inter-ethnic schools.

Also there was a State Pedagogical Institute in Khankendi, with more than 2.130 students and number of collages and training schools working in Armenian language.[42] The following table shows the social development as of 1988[43]:

Items Azerbaijan SSR NKAO USSR Armenia SSR
  1. Number of hospital beds per
    10,000 persons
97.7 101.7 130.1 86.2
  1. Number of physicians of all
    specialties per 10,000 persons
38.4 29.1 42.7 38.6
  1. Number of middle-level medical
    workers per 10,000 persons
93.5 122.7 114.4 93.5
  1. Number of public libraries per
    10,000 persons
6 13 4.8 4.1
  1. Number of clubs per 10,000
    persons
5 15 4.8 3.8
  1. Number of movie projectors
    [movie theatres] per 10,000 persons
3 11.2 5.4 2.9
  1. Number of children served by
    preschool institutions (in percentages of size of population of the corresponding age)
20 35 57 39
  1. Number of students attending first
    shift (in percentages of overall
    number of students)
74.3 92.5 78.2 87.8
  1. Housing fund per inhabitant
    (square meters)
10.9 14.6 14.9 13.7

Ethnic security dilemma and Nagorno- Karabakh conflict

In order to operationalize ethnic security dilemma on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the requirements of the theory must be tested. The starting point of the security dilemma according to Barry R. Posen is the “absence of a sovereign”. But when the conflict escalated in 1987, although the effectiveness and capability of USSR can be argued but it existed as the central state. So it is problematic to argue that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict started as a result of anarchy in the state level. The reform policies of USSR under the rule of M. Gorbachev were created such a situation for the frozen conflict to burn. If the history of USSR is examined from the period of V. Lenin to M. Gorbachev it can be seen that whenever there was an opportunity in the state level, the Armenian SSR and Armenian community of NKAO applied to USSR authorities restoring the “historic injustice” and uniting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenian SRR. These applications were done in the period when USSR leadership was soft, especially after the death of Stalin. The official web site of the Foreign Ministry of Republic of Armenia also confirms these applications, as mentioned above. These are important factors in the context of determining the nature of conflict because these facts confirms the position of the Armenian community of NKAO and Armenian SRR that they were never satisfied with ‘status quo’ and whenever there was an opportunity they tried to change the situation.

When the conflict escalated in 1987 the demands of the Armenian community of NKAO was not addressed to Azerbaijan SSR regarding their discriminative policies towards them. As it was described above, the demands and slogans in the demonstrations were the desire to unite with Armenian SSR.

The examination of Moscow’s (USSR) and Azerbaijan SSR’s position as well as Armenian SRR’s is crucial in the conflict. The core concepts of security dilemma as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘misperception’ are missing in this case. The flow of events shows that the demonstrations and mobilization of the nation began first in Armenia and later in Azerbaijan. The demonstrations in Armenia began with environmental issues and quickly passed into political demands i.e. unification of NKAO with Armenian SSR. So there was not uncertainty of Armenian community of NKAO towards Azerbaijan SSR. The effectiveness and outcome of the policies came from Moscow can be argued but in fact, the actions were done to settle the conflict by USSR authorities. For example, on 12 January 1988, NKAO was endowed with special status under the rule of A. Volsky that was answerable directly to Moscow. It was a period when NKAO was ruled “de facto” by Moscow but the demonstrations were continued. So there is a question rises that if the Armenian community of NKAO were uncertain about the actions of Azerbaijan SSR why they did not satisfied with the direct rule of Moscow?! Here, another confirmation comes that the Armenian community of NKAO were not satisfied with status-quo and wanted to unite with Armenian SSR.

The position of the Azerbaijan SSR in the conflict showed itself purely after the dissolution of USSR. It is generally accepted that the Sumgait events in February 1988, occurred as a response to removing of Azerbaijanis from Armenian SSR. The real causes and non-intervention to pogroms by USSR authorities is not known thoroughly according to S. Cornell. The official results confirm that in the clashes as well as Armenians there were also deaths from Azerbaijani side in Sumgait. Moreover, one week before the pogroms in Sumgait on 20 February 1988, as mentioned above, Soviet of People’s Deputies of Nagorno-Karabakh passed a resolution regarding unification with Armenian SSR. The series of events is important in order to examine the conflict. It would be argued that after the events in Sumgait the Armenian community of NKAO felt insecure and acted in that way if the resolution was accepted after the clashes in Sumgait. When it comes to operation “Ring” it would not be objective to examine the operation only on behalf of Azerbaijan SSR because as a result of presidential decree the Soviet army forces and Azerbaijani militia forces did the operation. The operation was done against the armed bands in NKAO. Till that operation there was not such an action against the armed bands in NKAO. The reason and causes of the creation of such armed bands is important in that context. The conflict escalated in 1987-1988 but the operation “Ring” was held on May-August 1991. So bearing in mind the fact that till the operation there was not armed attack or threat to the Armenian community of NKAO from the Azerbaijan SSR, the reason regarding the creation of these armed bands can be viewed as ‘offensive purposes’ rather than ‘defensive purposes’. The armed bands in NKAO were created to start a process of separation from the state they belong to rather than as a response to Azerbaijani SSR’s benign intention (misperception) to the Armenian minority.

It would not be objective to examine the conflict by putting aside the Armenian SSR. As the above mentioned facts of applications to the central authorities of USSR show, the Armenian SSR has always involved in the process. When the conflict escalated the Armenian SSR approved Supreme Soviet of Nagorno- Karabakh’s decision regarding its secession from Azerbaijani SSR. Human Rights Watch reported that arms were flowing from Armenia to Nagorno- Karabakh and observers have noted that military materials were brought from Beirut (Lebanese) by plane to Yerevan in order to delivering armed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.[44] If it is argued that the cause of these armaments was to increase the security of their brethren but the governmental position was not consistent with it by approving unification demands of NKAO without negotiating with Azerbaijan.

Conclusion

The application of security dilemma in the context of the conflict fails to explain the outcome. First of all the conflict escalated during the presence of USSR and it is not consistent with ‘the absence of sovereign’ concept of security dilemma. Moreover, if the applications are taken into account it can be seen that the escalation of conflict occurred as a consequence of opportunity by the reform policies of USSR. The special status of NKAO was abolished on November 28th one week after the cracking down of Azerbaijani helicopter which was carrying high state officials who were going to negotiations with Armenian community of NKAO. The examination of the facts shows that the conflict escalated as result of malcontent position of Armenian community of NKAO rather than the feeling of insecurity. The examination and analyse of the facts shows that the conflict occurred as a result of malcontent position of Armenian minority group of NKAO which backed by territorial claims of Armenia rather than as a result of security dilemma.

Shahriyar HAJIYEV

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival, vol. 35. no. 1, Spring 1993.
  2. Geukjian Ohanness, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict in the South Caucasus, Ashgate, 2012.
  3. Human Rights Watch. “Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”. December 1994.
  4. Roe, Paul. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 2, March, 1999.
  5. Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, Palgrave, 2000.
  6. Jervis Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, 1976.
  7. Roe Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, Routledge, 2005.
  8. Boulding, Kenneth, 1969. “National Images and International Systems”, in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory. New York: Free
  9. Libaridian Gerard, The Karabakh File, Cambridge Toronto, 1988.
  10. http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/.
  11. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998.
  12. Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999.
  13. Helsinki Watch, “Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, New York: Helsinki Watch, September 1992.
  14. Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, Hoover Inst Press Publication, 1992.
  15. Baguirov Adil, “Nagorno-Karabakh: basis and reality of Soviet-era legal and economic claims used to justify the Armenia-Azerbaijan war”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2008.

[1] Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival, vol. 35. no. 1, Spring 1993, p. 27.

[2] Geukjian Ohannes, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict in the South Caucasus, Ashgate, 2012, p. 70.

[3] Human Rights Watch. “Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”. December 1994, p. xiii.

[4] Roe, Paul. “The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 36, no. 2 (March, 1999), pp. 183-202.

[5] Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, Palgrave, 2000, p. 3.

[6] Jervis Robert, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, 1976, p. 15.

[7] Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict”, Survival, vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47.

[8] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[9] Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, Palgrave, 2000, p. 18.

[10] Roe Paul, The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a ‘Tragedy’?, Sage Publications, 1999, vol. 36, pp. 183-202.

[11] Roe Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, Routledge, 2005, p. 16.

[12] Boulding, Kenneth, 1969. “National Images and International Systems”, in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research Theory. New York: Free Press, pp. 422-431.

[13] Roe Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, Routledge, 2005, p. 21.

[14] Alan Collins, The Security Dilemmas of Southeast Asia, Palgrave, 2000, p. 18.

[15] Roe Paul, Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma, Routledge, 2005, p. 31.

[16] Geukjian Ohannes, Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict in the South Caucasus, Ashgate, 2012, p. 70.

[17] Ibid, p. 70.

[18] Libaridian Gerard, “Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Finalizing the Incorporation of Karabakh into Azerbaijan, July 1923”, The Karabakh File, p. 37.

[19] http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/.

[20] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict : Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 25.

[21] Libaridian Gerard, The Karabakh File, Cambridge Toronto, 1988, p. 87.

[22] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 26.

[23] Libaridian Gerard, The Karabakh File, Cambridge Toronto, 1988, p. 88.

[24] Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999, p. 12.

[25] Michael P. Croissant, “The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications”, Praeger, 1998, p. 26.

[26] Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999, p. 13.

[27] Ibid, p. 13.

[28] Libaridian Gerard, The Karabakh File, Cambridge Toronto, 1988, p. 93.

[29] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 28.

[30] Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999, p. 16.

[31] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 30.

[32] Ibid, p. 30.

[33] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 33.

[34] Ibid, p. 33.

[35] Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999, p. 22.

[36] Ibid, p. 722.

[37] Helsinki Watch, “Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, New            York: Helsinki Watch, September 1992: 9.

[38] Michael P. Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications, Praeger, 1998, p. 42.

[39] Ibid, pp. 42-43.

[40] Ibid, p. 46.

[41] Audrey L. Alstadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, Hoover Inst Press Publication, 1992, p. 274.

[42] Baguirov Adil, “Nagorno-Karabakh: basis and reality of Soviet-era legal and economic claims used to justify the Armenia-Azerbaijan war”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2008, pp. 8-9.

[43] Ibid., p. 9.

[44] Svante E. Cornell, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict”, Arbetsrappporter/Working Papers, 1999, p. 24.

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