The 60th United States (U.S.) Presidential election was won by the Republican Party candidate and the 45th President of the United States, businessman Donald Trump, who has the honor and success of serving as the 47th President of the United States for the period 2025-2029 – starting in January. Trump’s election, which was actually quite predictable, was also largely favored by the Turkish government and state structures. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had already made his reaction to the 46th U.S. President Joe Biden and the Democratic administration, who did not even speak to him on the phone for months after his election and then did not invite him to the White House for the Democracy Summit. Erdoğan, last year even declined an official invitation from American officials at last minute and played all his cards for Trump’s election. In this sense, Ankara will undoubtedly be much more willing and determined to overcome some problems with Trump in the new era. Let us now comment on possible developments based on these issues.
Unlike Democratic administrations, Republican President-elect Donald Trump, who prefers to interfere less in the domestic affairs of allied states, may be less critical of Ankara on Türkiye’s domestic issues in the new term, except for issues that are important to him, such as the security of Americans and not fueling anti-Americanism, not allowing threats to Israel’s security, protecting the non-Muslim population and not putting obstacles to the religious freedoms of Christians, etc., and this may lead to some warming in relations. The fact that both leaders like the kind of leader diplomacy with weaker institutional foundations and try to present a strong Presidential profile may also cause them to have chemistry with each other, which can be traced in Trump’s first term as President (2017-2021).
Another important issue concerns arms sales. While the sale of F-16s, which Türkiye has been trying to secure by delaying Finland and Sweden’s membership in NATO, has not still materialized despite promises given to Ankara, the Trump administration may act much faster and more willingly in this regard and finalize the sale of fighter jets to Türkiye. The Trump administration may also give the green light for Türkiye’s readmission to the F-35 program if the S-400 issue, which is seen as objectionable for NATO security, is somehow resolved. For Trump, who came to power with the goal of revitalizing the American economy, arms sales are an important issue that will improve the economy.
As for the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG groups in Syria, which the U.S. has been supporting for years against the Assad regime and ISIS (Islamic State), Trump may not allow policies to be implemented that would completely eliminate the terrorist-linked Kurdish presence in the region to the extent imagined by Türkiye, but he may prefer Ankara’s continued military presence in the region and a certain degree of reconciliation between the two American allies against ISIS through dialogue. For Trump, the presence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), a NATO member, on the ground would be an advantageous situation if they act in concert with the U.S. This can also be said for the Turkish Armed Forces’ de facto presence in northern Cyprus. However, I should add that unlike 2017-2021 period, now U.S. foreign policy is much more closer to Greek Cypriots as proven by the recent defense agreement between Washington and Nicosia.
Another factor that makes Trump attractive for Türkiye is his desire to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Given that Türkiye has not cut its economic ties with Russia throughout the war, despite all the pressure from the Western world, a U.S.-Russia reconciliation could be a relief for Ankara, which has intensive commercial, energy, and political relations with Moscow. Since this would also allow the Erdoğan administration to improve its economy, which is suffering from high inflation and the rapid depreciation of the Turkish lira, facilitating trade with Russia could make Trump a good President for the current Turkish government. What economists are reluctant to say is that international markets still respond to signals from the U.S. when it comes to investment.
Another factor that makes Trump attractive for Türkiye may be the fact that the U.S. President’s foreign policy rhetoric and actions mostly target countries such as Iran and China. Ankara, which, despite its close relations with Iran, can also be positioned as a rival in regional politics, may welcome Trump’s escalation of tensions with Iran, knowing that it will gain importance in geopolitical projections and strategic moves in the region. While the Erdoğan administration will not want to jeopardize the recently good political and economic relations with China, it may not be unhappy with the escalation of tensions between the U.S. and China and the raising of the Uyghur Turks or East Turkestan issue by American officials. In fact, Ankara’s official policy is to protect the cultural autonomy and religious freedoms of the Uyghur Turks, although this issue has not been brought up much in recent years in order not to disturb China.
The choice of Trump’s Secretary of State is also an important issue, with Florida Senator Marco Rubio’s name being frequently mentioned in the American press. Rubio is a foreign policy hawk and is not known to be pro-Türkiye. This suggests that it would be unrealistic to expect a “spring” in relations in the new term.
In any case, it is not yet realistic to expect a rapid improvement and a new spring in Turkish-American relations. The problems are structural and relations are frayed. Nevertheless, a new administration always means a new chance and we hope that the two states will not miss this opportunity. The Israeli-Palestinian issue will be the most difficult challenge for the two states. In the event of continued U.S. support for Israel’s brutal policies, Erdoğan should not be expected to remain silent, given the rise of alternative Islamist parties in Türkiye (the New Welfare Party/YRP). However, if Trump comes with a reasonable peace plan (e.g. a revised version of the Deal of the Century) and Israel halts its military operations, there may be no crisis.
Prof. Ozan ÖRMECİ
