Introduction
A new diplomatic development concerning the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics happened last week with the signing of a defense deal between the United States of America (U.S.) and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), known as the Greek Cypriot Administration in Türkiye. Signed in the Cypriot capital Nicosia, with the participation of U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander and Cypriot Minister of Defense Vassilis Palmas, the agreement envisages the roadmap for a defense pact between Washington and Nicosia.[1] In this paper, I will analyze the essence and importance of this new security deal.
Short History of Cyprus
Stayed long decades under Ottoman Turks’ control between 1570 and 1878, Cyprus became a British colony in 1878 (officially in 1914).[2] Composed mainly of two large ethnic groups; Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and some minorities, the island became an independent Republic (the Republic of Cyprus) on 16 August 1960 following the 1959 London and Zurich Agreements (11-19 February 1959). With these agreements and the new constitution adopted in 1960, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, and Greece were declared three guarantor powers of the Mediterranean state. Moreover, these three guarantor states recognized the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus (Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee)[3] and were given the right to intervene in case of a breach of agreement (Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee)[4].
However, located in a strategically crucial position, the small island’s bi-communal administration had difficulties from the first day and the new state was perceived in a sense as an “unintended baby” (istenmeyen bebek) by ultranationalist groups on both sides (Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots versus Greece and Greek Cypriots) using Stelgias’ terminology[5]. Accordingly, with the emergence of ultranationalist EOKA-B’s attacks on the Turkish community and traumatic events such as the Bloody Christmas (Kanlı Noel) of 20-21 December 1963, the Cyprus issue became the “Cyprus Problem” for Türkiye. While the Turkish administration intended to intervene on the island first time in 1963 upon Turkish Cypriots’ decision to withdraw from the government following the Greek Cypriot proposals to amend the constitution, then-U.S. President Lyndon Johnson’s infamous letter (the Johnson Letter) warning then-Prime Minister of Türkiye İsmet İnönü stopped Turkish intervention in that year. A line of ceasefire called the Green Line was drawn in Nicosia in 1964 and United Nations forces were sent to Cyprus to prevent ethnic clashes between two communities. In the meantime, closely following the rise of anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim sentiments among Greek Cypriots and Greeks, Türkiye continued to prepare for a military intervention into the island to secure Turkish Cypriots and finally executed the military operation successfully in 1974 under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit. Since then, Cyprus has been divided into two parts; the Turkish Cypriot part (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus/TRNC since 1983, a de facto state only recognized by Ankara) and the Greek Cypriot part (still labeled as the Republic of Cyprus in the international area but called as Greek Cypriot or South Cyprus Administration in Türkiye).
Since 1974, various attempts to unify the island failed each time. Moreover, no further bloodshed took place between the two communities. In that sense, many Turkish experts believe that the Turkish intervention in 1974, which aimed at the beginning restoring order but later eventually created a new status quo based on two states, became very successful and created a peaceful reality on the ground: two separate and independent states. However, based on UN Security Council decisions, Greek Cypriots and Greeks continued to protest Turkish military presence in Cyprus and defined this as the “Turkish invasion”. With Greek and Greek Cypriot entry into the European Union, almost all European states also began to defend their allies and antagonize Türkiye because of the status quo.
Security Policy of Greek Cypriot Administration
While the Republic of Cyprus has been an independent state since 1960, two British sovereign military bases in the south, Akrotiri and Dhekelia continued to operate by the Treaty and Guarantee and the constitution. British military bases are still critical as part of the United States and NATO’s Middle Eastern policy, and they have been operational in many recent military operations. However, established as a leading Non-Aligned Movement member country under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, the RoC did not become a NATO member during the tense Cold War period and enjoyed better relations with Russia (then USSR) compared to other Western countries. On the other hand, on the north, a NATO member military, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) seized control since the Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974 and protected Turkish Cypriots.
In the early 2000s, with the discovery of natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot Administration engaged in alternative foreign policy initiatives. Nicosia became an EU member in 2004, thus, securing its position as the official representative of the island in Western diplomatic circles. Moreover, starting during François Hollande’s presidency, the RoC signed some defense agreements with France, which were condemned by Ankara[6]. More recently, Cyprus became one of the 26 active members of the European security initiative PESCO[7] as well and consolidated Brussels’ support for its anti-Türkiye positioning.
In addition, to solidify its position in the region, Nicosia, with the help of Greece, developed closer relations with Israel recently. Three countries even tried to establish the EastMed Pipeline project[8], which was later found to be too costly and risky due to Türkiye’s exclusion. However, Nicosia-Tel Aviv (Jerusalem) relations continued to improve and the two countries reached a historical high level of diplomatic relations by organizing joint military exercises recently, which were condemned by the TRNC.[9]
In the last few years, with the spoiling of Turkish-American relations after the failed coup attempt in 2016, Nicosia began to improve its relations with the U.S. as well. So, Washington first lifted its arms embargo on Nicosia in 2023[10], a clear sign of changing American priorities in the region. Moreover, the U.S. and the RoC launched the Defense and Security Dialogue platform[11] to improve their strategic relations in the last few years. Although the U.S. and Türkiye are two NATO members and historical allies, the two countries increasingly found themselves at odds due to their constant support for rival countries against each other. For instance, while Türkiye purchased the S-400 air missile defense system from Russia instead of Washington or European consortiums and did not want to join sanctions against Moscow during the ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, the U.S. began to support all anti-Türkiye actors in the region including terrorist organizations such as the PYD/YPG (offshoots of PKK) and non-NATO member countries such as the RoC. In that sense, the defense deal between Washington and Nicosia is certainly not a surprise, but an offensive move that is against the solidarity spirit. Thus, French President Emmanuel Macron’s comments about NATO as “brain dead”[12] become very rational as the two leading armies of the alliance work against each other’s interests.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the deal establishes a roadmap for bilateral defense cooperation.[13] The press release after the deal published by the U.S. Department of Defense labels the two countries as “like-minded partners to ensure peace, stability, democratic principles, and rule of law”[14]. Moreover, the press release underlines the necessity of cooperation between the two states concerning humanitarian crises, climate change, countering malign influence, and establishing interoperability between military forces.[15]
Türkiye immediately condemned the Cyprus-U.S. defense deal. The press declaration of the Turkish Foreign Ministry focused on the U.S. loss of neutrality concerning the Cyprus Problem.[16] Ankara also called on the U.S. to reconsider its position vis-a-vis the island.[17]
An anti-Turkish Move or a Plausible Regional Policy?
While Turkish-American relations hit the bottom recently, regional politics also forced the two countries to pursue different policies. In three recent and concrete cases, we can follow a similar pattern.
Syria: In Syria, while both the U.S. and Türkiye tried to topple the Assad regime, with the emergence of ISIS and other radical Islamic movements, the two countries found themselves in hostile positions. While the U.S. saw the secular-minded PKK offshoots PYD/YPG as an antidote against Islamic radical groups and the Assad regime, Türkiye for a long time kept its close relations with Sunni rebels and only targeted ISIS in order not to empower the Assad regime. The two countries’ Syria policies could not be coordinated smoothly although former Ankara ambassador James Jeffrey was designated as special representative for Syria. More recently, Türkiye, with the support of Russia, tried to normalize its relations with Damascus but so far, no normalization has taken place. In the meantime, Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler stated three preconditions of Ankara: 1) Adoption of the new constitution, 2) Making of democratic elections, and 3) Securing of borders.[18]
Greece: Due to historical tensions, the increasing U.S. military presence in Greek islands and Alexandroupoli was considered a threat by Türkiye.[19] While the U.S. tried to reassure Türkiye that its military presence in Greece was a balanced response to Russian aggression in Ukraine to strengthen European security, Ankara continued to perceive this as part of a larger anti-Turkish policy. Again, the two countries did not engage in a clash directly, but their regional policies did not match due to different priorities.
Cyprus: While the U.S.-Cyprus defense deal is again perceived as an anti-Turkish move by Ankara, the real reason might be related to the security of Israel instead. It is no secret that the Southern Cyprus and especially British military bases there are used to supply the Israeli Army.[20] In fact, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah even threatened the Greek Cypriot Administration that it would be “part of the war” if it continued to help Israel.[21] So, increasing U.S.-Cypriot rapprochement might be more related to the security of Israel against Iran, Hezbollah, and other Shiite proxies rather than threatening Ankara and Turkish Cypriots.
Retired rear admiral from the Turkish Navy, Dr. Deniz Kutluk claims that the U.S. military presence in Türkiye -in the Incirlik military base- has been considerably reduced after the 2016 failed coup attempt and the U.S. tries to deploy its forces in the region in alternative locations.[22] Moreover, both Kutluk and Prof. Hasan Ünal believe that this move could be more related to U.S. domestic politics since the presidential election is approaching in the U.S. and the Greek lobby could be influential in deciding the winner (Kamala Harris or Donald Trump).[23] Kutluk also believes that Washington tries to test Ankara’s reactions with such moves, but due to a lack of political rationale among Greek Cypriots, this would cause further problems for the U.S. and Turkish-American relations.[24] Kutluk also warns that in case of a potential conflict in the coming years, Türkiye’s next strategic move would be to take control of the whole island.[25] Lastly, Kutluk underlines that the U.S.-Cyprus deal is against the founding agreements of the RoC and Cypriot constitution.[26]
Conclusion
To conclude, while the U.S.-Cyprus defense deal could be more related to the security of Israel against Iran and Hezbollah threats, it is obvious that Turkish-American relations have advanced in a very negative atmosphere recently. Two countries have numerous problems and during Joe Biden’s presidency, none of these problems could have been resolved so far. Even the agreement about the Swedish accession to NATO in return for Türkiye’s acquisition of F-16 fighter jets could not be completed so far. So, we hope that the two historical allies will find ways to improve their relations following the U.S. presidential election this year and open a new blank page in bilateral relations next year.
Lastly, the U.S.-Cyprus defense deal also proves that the RoC is a virtual state and there are two real political entities on the island: the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Cover Photo: https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/bilateral-defense-roadmap-signed-by-cyprus-u-s
Prof. Ozan ÖRMECİ
FOOTNOTES
[1] KNews (2024), “Bilateral defense roadmap signed by Cyprus, U.S.”, 09.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/bilateral-defense-roadmap-signed-by-cyprus-u-s.
[2] Britannica, “Cyprus”, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.britannica.com/place/Cyprus.
[3] “ARTICLE II: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.” See; https://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/app.html.
[4] “ARTICLE IV: In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” See; https://web.deu.edu.tr/kibris/articles/app.html.
[5] Nikolaos Stelya (2013), İstenmeyen Bebek Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti, İstanbul: Kalkedon Yayınları.
[6] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı, “No:39 – Fransa ile GKRY Arasında İmzalanan Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşması hk.”, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_39—fransa-ile-gkry-arasinda-imzalanan-savunma-isbirligi-anlasmasi-hk_.tr.mfa.
[7] See; https://www.pesco.europa.eu/about/.
[8] See; https://depa-int.gr/en/interconnector-pipeline-eastmed/.
[9] See; https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/tr/gkry-ile-israilin-ortak-askeri-tatbikati-hk-2/.
[10] AlJazeera (2022), “Turkey condemns US decision to lift Cyprus arms embargo”, 17.09.2022, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/17/turkey-condemns-us-decision-to-lift-cyprus-arms-embargo.
[11] U.S. Department of Defense (2024), “2024 United States-Republic of Cyprus Defense and Security Cooperation Dialogue”, 11.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3902245/2024-united-states-republic-of-cyprus-defense-and-security-cooperation-dialogue/.
[12] BBC News (2019), “Nato alliance experiencing brain death, says Macron”, 07.11.2019, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50335257.
[13] U.S. Department of Defense (2024), “U.S.-Republic of Cyprus Roadmap for Bilateral Defense Cooperation”, 10.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3900867/us-republic-of-cyprus-roadmap-for-bilateral-defense-cooperation/.
[14] U.S. Department of Defense (2024), “Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus on the Signing of a Defense Cooperation Roadmap for 2024-2029”, 10.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3900834/joint-statement-by-the-united-states-of-america-and-the-republic-of-cyprus-on-t/.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Reuters (2024), “Turkey condemns Cyprus-US defence co-operation roadmap”, 12.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-condemns-cyprus-us-defence-co-operation-roadmap-2024-09-12/.
[17] Ezgi Akin (2024), “Turkey condemns US-Cyprus defense deal, urges Washington to ‘reconsider’”, Al-Monitor, 11.09.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/09/turkey-condemns-us-cyprus-defense-deal-urges-washington-reconsider.
[18] Hürriyet (2024), “Bakan Yaşar Güler’den Suriye’den çekilmenin üç şartı”, 13.08.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/bakan-yasar-gulerden-suriyeden-cekilmenin-uc-sarti-42503205.
[19] Ahmet Gençtürk (2022), “Growing US military presence in Greece can lead to undesired scenarios in Aegean, experts warn”, Anatolian Agency, 25.05.2022, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/growing-us-military-presence-in-greece-can-lead-to-undesired-scenarios-in-aegean-experts-warn/2596928.
[20] Andrew Wilks (2024), “UK’s alleged use of Cyprus bases to arm Israel and hit Yemen draw protests”, AlJazeera, 15.01.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/15/uk-bases-in-cyprus-protests.
[21] Paul Reymond (2024), “Hezbollah’s threat caught Cyprus off guard, what are the issues at stake?”, AlJazeera, 25.06.2024, Date of Accession: 16.09.2024 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/25/hezbollahs-threat-caught-cyprus-off-guard-what-are-the-issues-at-stake.
[22] See; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EjjzT_51Pww.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
