The 36th Civil Chamber of the Ankara Regional Court of Appeals concluded that the CHP’s 2023 congress (38th ordinary congress) was “absolutely void“; it ordered the removal of CHP Chairman Özgür Özel from office and the reinstatement of former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as a precautionary measure. The decision came as a shock to the new CHP leadership, who were very successful in the 2024 local elections by defeating the ruling AK Parti. The decision will lead to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s return as the party’s chair. Moreover, this will lead to the reinstatement of the members of the Party Council and the High Disciplinary Board who were elected at the 37th Ordinary Congress held on July 25-26, 2020. In that sense, the 20th Extraordinary Congress of the CHP, the 21st Extraordinary Congress, the 22nd Extraordinary Congress, and the 39th Ordinary Congress, all of which elected Özgür Özel’s administration, have also been cancelled.
The decision was based on allegations of irregularities at the party’s 38th ordinary congress in 2023. Among those voicing these allegations was Lütfü Savaş, the party’s former municipal leader of Hatay Metropolitan Municipality. The reason the decision has generated so much controversy is that, in addition to changing the leadership of the main opposition party, CHP, it also annulled the results accepted by the Supreme Election Board (YSK), whose decisions had never been questioned or altered before. In this respect, opposition circles claim that this is a kind of “political coup” carried out in defiance of the constitution. From now on, Özgür Özel and his team may try to circumvent this process by calling a new extraordinary congress. They may also create physical resistance and obstacles to prevent Kılıçdaroğlu and his team from returning to the party headquarters. However, within Türkiye’s current legal-political system, Kılıçdaroğlu’s return to the CHP chairmanship is expected.
Kılıçdaroğlu will have several different options. The first and most logical option would be to reach an agreement with Özgür Özel’s leadership, prepare the party for the next elections, and adopt a new party leadership that reflects a kind of balance or compromise between the two. In such a situation, Kılıçdaroğlu could try to appease the previous administration’s reaction by declaring İmamoğlu or Özel as the presidential candidate. However, this is more difficult to achieve due to the reactions against Kılıçdaroğlu. Another possibility is that Kılıçdaroğlu purges Özgür Özel’s team from the party leadership and even from the party itself, and regains control of the party with delegates of his own choosing. In such a scenario, it is possible that the CHP will split in two, and many figures, including Özgür Özel and Ekrem İmamoğlu, will move towards forming a new political party. A third possibility is that Özel and his team continue as an internal party opposition, allowing the party to maintain its political activities without splitting. However, if a compromise is not reached after such a harsh incident, the possibility of the party splitting is quite strong.
The impact of this event on Turkish politics will undoubtedly be an increase in distrust towards the opposition. In an environment where the success of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his party is being questioned due to serious economic problems, the opposition’s fragmented, divided, and problematic image will strengthen the ruling party’s hand in the eyes of the electorate. This is because the average Turkish voter, who places great importance on stability, will not have strong faith that an opposition party unable to achieve internal unity can govern the country smoothly. Therefore, this event is, without a doubt, a historic turning point that paves the way for Erdoğan’s third term as President. In this context, it is also thought that the President may decide to hold snap elections in the coming autumn months, following a few positive steps in the “Terror-Free Türkiye” (Terörsüz Türkiye) process and partial economic improvements.
In conclusion, recent events in Türkiye exemplify the democratic regressions seen in democracies during periods marked by the rise of highly successful and powerful populist leaders and the concentration of power. Of course, Türkiye will return to democracy in the coming years and emerge from this transitional period. However, the reasons for this period must be sought in previous periods, including: the intensification of geopolitical competition and conflicts worldwide; the desire for revenge from Islamist and Kurdish groups who were previously marginalised in the country; Erdoğan’s success as a leader who understands public sentiment well; and the distrust created among the public due to the opposition’s inability to present a sound governance program. Our wish is for Türkiye to overcome critical hurdles in this process, such as the adoption of a civilian constitution and the dismantling of the terrorist organisation (PKK), and to complete its preparations for the next period.
Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ
