BRETTON WOODS AND EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

Abstract: Bretton Woods aided Europe’s recovery after World War II with the European Recovery Program in 1947, under the framework of Marshall Aid. This led to the formation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950, which facilitated the redistribution of aid among countries. Thus, following the upheaval of the two wars, the Great Depression, and the interwar period, one of Bretton Woods’ primary goals was to promote economic cooperation among member governments. This led to a more fundamental goal of European Monetary Integration, which is the underlying idea of promoting trade and prosperity throughout the continent. The potential consequences of Bretton Woods’ collapse, as well as the ensuing destabilizing financial shocks and crises, highlight Europe’s need for safety, which is another external reason for the integration process of the monetary system After the collapse of Bretton Woods, European nations sought new exchange rate arrangements for managing inflation, which resulted in the European Monetary System. The process included both failures and successes throughout the evolving integration of the European Monetary System, which began with the Treaties of Rome in 1957. The rationale for halting initiatives and continuing efforts is the same: protecting Europe from destabilizing impacts while fostering economic cooperation and trade between states. The European Monetary System was viewed as an alternative to the problems encountered by the previous Bretton Woods system, which aimed for monetary stability but ultimately failed to achieve it. The ideas that Bretton Woods brought to the international financial spectrum also shaped the rationale behind the European monetary integration process. This rationale hinges on preventing instability, promoting trade and cooperation, and ensuring safety under a coherent and well-structured monetary regime.

Keywords: Bretton Woods, European Monetary System, Economic Cooperation, Monetary System, Financial Order, Stability.

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Introduction

The International Money System is the most important step for understanding the forces behind the macroeconomic structure. To start with, international finance theory comprises multiple countries with more than one chip and controller. (Shubik, 1999: 28) Moreover, governments and macroeconomic agents, rather than small-scale economic agents, apply these structures and rules. (Shubik, 1999: 28). However, the important point is that although the IFS (International Finance System) primarily relies on the IMS (International Monetary System), it has broader interests than the IMS. For instance, the interest areas under the International Finance System are banks and other financial institutions, non-market activities such as private equity transactions, and hedge funds.

The key points in IMS are the money and its flows, central banks, international financial institutions, commercial banks, and various market funds (Fosler, 2011: 1). The key difference between a monetary system and a financial system is that the monetary system is not interested in bearing. So that means the monetary system constitutes “an integrated set of money flows and related governance institutions that establish the quantities of money, the means for supporting currency requirements and the basis for exchange among currencies to meet payments obligations within and across countries” (Fosler, 2011: 1)

It is about the monetary relationship between nations, governed by rules and institutions. The essay, which focuses on the Bretton Woods system and its impact on the European Monetary regime, will discuss the international monetary system, as the topics relate to currency, money flow, and governance institutions. Concerning the historical timeline of the international monetary regime, it begins with bimetallism (1800-1875), the gold standard (1875-1914), the interwar gold standard period (1914-1944), Bretton Woods (1944-1971), and the fiat currency regime (1971 onwards). Although the international monetary regime’s evolution process started with bimetallism standards based on the use of two metals, gold and silver were later replaced, and the system underwent extensive alterations throughout the period. Later, the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system emerged, both of which were fixed exchange regimes. To start with, the gold standard regime was based on gold’s retail convertibility; subsequently, the Bretton Woods System relied on central bank administration. As a side note, the USD functioned as a substitute for gold in the Bretton Woods System under the fixed exchange monetary regime of convertibility. The international global economy has suffered extensively due to the absence of regulatory bodies, control and check mechanisms, and cohesion in the system. Lastly, referring to the “fiat money regime”, it is essential to understand that it fluctuates dynamically against other currencies on the foreign exchange markets. That means the value of a currency is not based on the physical commodity.

After the closure of the Gold Standard in the Bretton Woods monetary system, European nations began to seek a new exchange rate agreement to complement their customs union. Its main objectives were to stabilize inflation and the exchange rate. Under the Bretton Woods system, the European economy recovered in 1947, thanks to the European Recovery Program, which received substantial aid. More importantly, to revise the aid distribution under the Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU) were created in 1948 and 1950, respectively. After significant steps were taken through agreements and treaties, the European Monetary System was established in response to the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary regime. According to the authors, “Regulation and prudential supervision of banks and financial intermediaries is, to a large extent, a post-Bretton Woods phenomenon.” (Frataianni & Pattison, 2002: 184)

This essay explains the evolving process of international monetary regimes, shedding light on the development of the European Monetary System, which fostered economic cooperation and a stable financial order among member states. It also deals with the integration process by conducting descriptive research analysis in a historical order-based framework.  The historical evolution of the gold standard regime to the post-Bretton Woods era brought both limitations and advances to the understanding of “how the upcoming monetary regime ought to be?”

Historical Background

“Classical gold standard era” began in England in 1819 and spread to France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, and the United States. Furthermore, “the major countries of the world were on the gold standard proper only from the 1870s to 1914, and briefly between the two world wars”. (Cooper, 1982: 4) The Gold Standard regime was a key system in which currency was linked to a predetermined amount of gold, substantially altering the global economic landscape.

There was no cohesion at all, except for the significant countries such as France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany. The monetary authority in each country linked domestic prices to the price of gold (Alper, 2016: 140). That system lacks regulations and effective oversight mechanisms, and central banks are not consistently applying preliminary rules and obligations. Based on the article written by Samule Knafo, that limitation was characterized as a turning point as the foundation by stating that “The gold standard thus consisted in an attempt to institutionalize the creation of fiduciary money by imposing the convertibility of banknotes and establishing a central bank.” (Knafo, 2006: 80). Gold Standard regime ended during the 1930s because of both external and systematic failure reasons. Regarding external factors that contributed to the impact of World War, a significant amount of government debt can be listed. Following the Gold Standard regime, the period is known as the Interwar Period (1920s-1930s). During this period, the renowned British economist John Maynard Keynes argued against returning to the gold standard (this was in 1925, before he wrote his famous General Theory in 1936).

The interwar gold regime period was characterized by rivalry among key currencies within three blocs: residual gold standard areas, sterling areas, and central and eastern European countries (Alper, 2016: 143). This means that the distinction between currencies and the monetary system became more blurred during that period, and many countries chose not to hold their currencies in gold. So, the article exemplified, “The international financial system of the pre-1930s period had been characterized by informal ‘rules of the game’ and a kind of networked financial governance involving central banks and private financiers.” (Helleiner, 2010: 620). And then the idea occurred, “The world should move to paper currency managed scientifically and responsibly by central banks.” However, it provided less flexibility than many economists thought was required, leading to the rise and spread of the Great Depression. In addition to that, the impact of World War, widespread inflation, and the Great Depression highlighted deflationary pressures in the U.S. and led to the weakening of the global economy, which also contributed to the erosion of the interwar gold standard regime. D’Arista in his study stated the underlying reason for that: “As the world slips once again into crisis, there is renewed discussion of the need to reform the global financial and monetary architecture.” (D’Arista, 2009: 1)

Bretton Woods System

While the international monetary regime has evolved since the gold standard era, the process has integrated both the successes and failures of the previous stage. In light of the author’s words; “The international regime evolved thereafter with the end of the gold anchor (1971)..” (Bénassy- Quéré, A.; Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2011: 8) Bretton Woods’ system hinges on three major landmarks in 1944: the creation of two global financial institutions called the IMF, later known as WB, but formerly the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, and the global finance order. Both institutions, formed on the same date, are sometimes referred to as the Bretton Woods Twins. (Egilmez, 2000: 77). Notably, Bretton Woods strengthened the economy and promoted international trade profit by bringing 44 nations together and establishing a fixed currency exchange rate. Furthermore, countries promised to remove trade restrictions between themselves and convert their currencies. Under the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates were supposed to be “Fixed but adjustable” to prevent unilateral adjustment of the previous monetary regime. That means, “Most currencies were pegged to the dollar, itself pegged to gold (hence the gold-exchange standard), but the corresponding exchange rates were adjustable in the event of ‘fundamental misalignments’”. (Bénassy-Quéré, A.; Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2011: 8) This regime aimed to promote free trade and a fixed exchange regime.

The Bretton Woods conference marked a monumental step in advancing international cooperation, leading to the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. To support that, the author underscored the conference “July 1944 conference, it appears, has become a symbol of bold and decisive action to redesign the international financial system in the wake of a financial crisis. It is easy to understand why” (Helleiner, 2010: 620). This was the first concrete step toward international cooperation and regulation in the financial system, leading to the rapid economic growth of Western countries and an increase in global trade. According to the IMF Articles of Agreement, “the conception of the Bretton Woods system was the reconstruction of world trade after the Second World War and the Great Depression. Firstly, the system aimed to promote exchange stability. Secondly, a multilateral payment system should be established for targeted transactions. Finally, the IMF provides the finance to correct maladjustments. All were made to promote international trade by eliminating foreign exchange restrictions that could hamper the volume of global trade and international prosperity. “(Ocampo, 2016: 2).

The U.S. balance of payments took some time, and there was considerable demand for the U.S. dollar worldwide, resulting in liquidity issues. The U.S. dollar was the international reserve currency, which created sovereign issues for many other nations. Other nations believed that this system gave the U.S. an undue advantage. U.S. dollar yielded a higher rate of return when sold internationally and a lower rate when sold domestically. Finally, the government declared restrictions on gold-dollar conversions in response to inflation and the current account balance deficit. All in all, the major reasons for underpinning the U.S. in the international finance system hinge on increasing domestic spending, the deficit in the balance of payment, and the cost of the Vietnam War. To support that point, the article underscored the situation in Nixon’s presidency by saying, “What mattered most about his reelection prospects was national economic growth and especially lower rates of unemployment.” (Forsyth, 2021: 1) Nixon was concerned about depleting U.S. gold reserves, which could not cover the dollars circulating in the system. The system depleted U.S. gold reserves as more U.S. dollars were issued to meet increasing international demand. In 1971, the Gold Standard, which aimed to convert USD to gold at a fixed rate of $35, was abandoned during Nixon’s presidency. In 1973, a fixed exchange rate was established in the post-Bretton Woods system, allowing countries freedom of choice regarding their exchange currency regimes.  Concerning the author, the breakdown of Bretton Woods marked the end of U.S. financial dominance. The absence of a new center of international management set the stage for a centrifugal international monetary system. (Bordo, 1995: 318)

European Monetary System

By creating the Bretton Woods system, only multilateral economic cooperation could ensure that all countries could achieve full employment and social well-being at home with government intervention, if necessary. “So by aiming never to experience a devastating period like the one in the aftermath of WW 2, the US created new global financial organizations and prepared economic aid to well-damaged Europe in the bipolar world order during the Cold War.” (Jacobs, 2023: 114) The U.S. was afraid that poverty, unemployment, and relocation after World War II could have reinforced the rise of communist parties under the Truman presidency. 13 $ billion in Marshall Aid was given to rebuild Western Europe, which provided dollar funding to European countries, allowed the relative scarcity of gold to be circumvented (Bénassy-Quéré, A.; Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2011: 35).

The ECA (European Cooperation Administration), a U.S. government agency, allocated aid, providing dollar assistance to Europe for purchasing commodities such as food, fuel, and machinery, as well as allocating funds for specific projects, particularly infrastructure projects. By doing so, restoring industrial and agricultural production had been targeted. Moreover, extensive investment in the region and promotion of trade are needed. Countries participating in the plan are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The outcome of the aid was a 10 percent increase in the gross national product, primarily due to the revitalization of the agricultural and industrial sectors. From that perspective, the World Bank played an important role in that program. When the Marshall Plan achieved the renovation of Europe after the war, the bank turned toward investment solutions for countries on a path toward development by enforcing market expansion and global trade (Egilmez, 2000: 83)

The Bretton Woods system also provided a path for the European Monetary System (EMS), aligning with the recovery of European economies in the aftermath of World War II. The EMS was established primarily to encourage monetary cooperation among member nations, leading to more stable domestic and international financial policies. During the time course that led to the establishment of the European Monetary System, the first Committee of European Economic Cooperation was established. Afterwards, this was replaced by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 and the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950 to revise the aid distribution. During the fixed exchange rate regime, the European Monetary Agreement was established, and under this agreement, a European Fund and Multilateral Systems of Settlement were established. It was not a landmark for the EMS; “Instead, more importance was given to establishing the common market, customs union, and standard policies.” (Devilorias, 2015: 2). Indeed, they were major landmarks for the more unified and less heterogeneous spectrum of the European financial and monetary system. It was explained before; there was no well-defined and structured unity among nations during the gold standard and interwar monetary regimes in the European continent. After Bretton Woods, the EMS was established in 1979 and had a well-established monetary structure, facilitating the monetary unification of Europe.

During the period from the European Economic Community to the European Monetary System, several key landmarks were established: the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the Marjolin Memorandum in 1962, and the Werner Report in 1970. Concerning the Treaties of Rome – This was one of the most important landmarks for the foundation acts of the European Community, specifically the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community, also known as EURATOM. Article 2, two treaties were signed for two purposes. One aims to foster closer links and boost economic growth among six participating countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Moreover, in the first articles, it was stated that the primary objective of the community was to create a common market. That is why the treaty abolished the customs duties between the Member States. Instead, it established a standard external tariff. The European Economic Community’s primary objectives were to establish a unified agricultural market and a customs union when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957. Neither was thought to need monetary integration. However, it prepared solid background as the article explained: “Even the Treaties of Rome were from the start considered as a sort of master-key to political integration on the continent, an interpretation that subsequently would continue to characterize all the stages of European integration, including monetary unification”(Preda, 2016: 10) Only with the publication of the so-called “Marjolin Memorandum” in 1962 did it become clear that a single market and a single currency were related, and a serious conversation about the European monetary union started. The Werner Report of 1970 provided frameworks for establishing the economic and monetary unions and outlined the significant transfers of responsibilities that needed to be delegated during the integration process. It was conducted after the European Summit in The Hague in 1969, where the members of the European Community agreed to prepare a plan for economic and monetary union. Reference to M. Pierre Werner’s own words during his speech, “The Hague Conference ought to go down in history as the meeting that confirmed the fundamental political and economic objectives of the Treaties and made further Community developments possible.”  (The Hague, 1969: 48). Werner Report was considered as a basis by the European Economic Community while setting a plan for the economic and monetary union. Specifically, the Werner Report outlines two stages that set the framework for further integration. Nevertheless, the plan was never fully implemented, as it failed to introduce the importance of stage introduction and transfer of decision-making on the economic policy, which set the fundamental bases.

As for the first stage, which lasted three years, exchange links between Community currencies were to be gradually tightened, and any increase in volatility between Member States in general would be limited to generally steady levels. In the second stage, these courses of action would be pursued in a more binding manner. A European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was established in 1973 to carry out the necessary operations on the foreign exchange market to ensure monetary coherence among Member States. A council of six was formed to develop macroeconomic policy. The strategy provided in the Werner Report, assuming stable exchange rates against the U.S. dollar, was not implemented due to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Member States were willing to establish the economic and monetary union. However, several major global events gave pause to the implementation of the European Economic Commission’s three-stage plan. These significant events include the global monetary crisis of 1971 (the dollar crisis) and the oil shock of 1973. In line with weak compliance, the oil crisis led to the failure of the “Snake in the Tunnel” mechanism, which had enabled states to fluctuate within narrow limits against the dollar and allowed central banks to buy and sell European currencies with a limited fluctuation margin of 2.25 %. Therefore, the failure of previous mechanisms may not have accelerated the integration of the monetary system; rather, efforts to create a European Monetary System continued. The reason why attempts have been halted and why efforts have continued lies in the same objective: protecting Europe from destabilizing effects and advancing economic cooperation among member states. According to the article, the author disclosed, “European countries were not happy with the dollar standard but were afraid of the alternative“(Bordo, 1995: 317). However, after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the EMS was established in 1979. The European Monetary System (EMS) was a flexible exchange rate mechanism established in 1979 to promote greater monetary policy coordination among European Community (EC) members. The European Monetary System (EMS) was established to stabilize inflation and prevent substantial exchange rate fluctuations between neighboring nations, thereby promoting international trade in goods. The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) superseded the European Monetary System (EMS), which established a unified currency, the euro.

The EMS was perceived as a solution to the issues encountered by the preceding Bretton Woods system, which had attempted to achieve monetary stability but ultimately failed (Dell, 1994: 5). Fostering economic cooperation among member states is inherent in the main objectives of Bretton Woods, following the turmoil of the world wars. Protecting Europe from destabilizing financial shocks and crises can be seen as a preliminary protection mechanism against the collapse of Bretton Woods.

Conclusion

This essay is divided into three sections: the historical background section, the descriptive analysis of the Bretton Woods system, and the evolving process of the European monetary system. The historical background part primarily examined the Gold Standard Regime. This regime started in the 1870s and spread throughout Europe, with differentiations among regions. This lies in the notion of non-cohesion between countries, which is only applied by the major countries. Roughly speaking, the gold system that linked the country’s money supply to gold lacked the control and check mechanism that the aforementioned exemplified. The reasons why the gold standard regime collapsed, bringing its successes and failures into Bretton Woods’ system, are rooted in the system’s external factors and internal dilemmas. First, World War I harshly affected the global economic spectrum, coinciding with the stock market crash and the Great Depression of the 1929-1930s.

The lack of a check-and-balance mechanism, non-cohesion, and a lack of global order characterized the internal dilemmas of the system. That, in turn, led to the establishment of the global financial order and the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund during the Bretton Woods era. The IMF and the World Bank were called the Bretton Woods twins and were established to embed cooperation and regulation into the international financial system, which had suffered greatly from the previous stage. To promote cohesion in the global financial order, 44 nations came together for the first time in 1944 and agreed on the economic principles of the upcoming system in the Bretton Woods agreement in New Hampshire. Bretton Woods’s system required a currency peg to the US dollar, which was, in turn, pegged to the price of gold. Before the Bretton Woods conference, the world economy had been severely damaged by inflation, unemployment, and world wars, making cooperation among nations crucial for promoting trade and removing restrictions. The ending of the Bretton Woods system has three important domestic reasons for the United States, in line with the significant problems. Regarding domestic reasons, these include high inflation, an account deficit in the balance of payments, increasing domestic spending, and the cost of the Vietnam War. On the other hand, under Bretton Woods, there was a liquidity issue in meeting increased demand with the existing supply. Relying on US dominance and its currency created sovereign problems in the international arena. Bretton Woods’s idea of multilateral economic cooperation among nations was the fundamental understanding of integrating European monetary regimes. The European recovery program after World War II began with the Marshall Plan in 1947, and the U.S. government agency facilitated the redistribution of $ 13 billion in aid to European countries, primarily through the Economic Cooperation Administration. During the time course, to overcome difficulties after the wars, economic instability became a core understanding of European financial policy.

European Monetary System, established in 1979 after the collapse of Bretton Woods, had several significant milestones, including establishing institutions and legal frameworks. Firstly, related to the institutional base, the Committee of European Economic Cooperation had evolved into the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, which was related to the European Monetary Agreement. Moreover, the European Monetary Agreement established the European Fund and the Multi-System of Settlement. The fundamental point in that regard is that the institutional evolution of the monetary regime did not directly affect monetary coherence. It significantly affected the common market, customs unions, and standard policies of the European states. In this context, European Economic Cooperation bodies have sought to promote regional cooperation and development by fostering global trade and mutual trust among countries. Secondly, related to the legal framework dimension, the evolution process occurred through the Treaties of Rome (1957), the Marjolin Memorandum (1962), and the Werner Report (1970). Chronologically, the Treaty of Rome was a pivotal step in establishing the European Economic Community; subsequently, the Marjolin Memorandum paved the way for the single market and single currency understandings. However, it was not until the Werner Report, which exemplified how monetary integration in Europe should be, that the plan was set accordingly. Finally, with the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1979, monetary coherence was achieved.

Cansu Ece GÖKŞİN

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