Introduction
As we leave 2025 behind and enter 2026, I wanted to review the news and analyses published by the International Policy Academy (IPA) throughout 2025 and share with our readers the topics we were most engaged with and interested in this year. On this occasion, I wish for 2026 to be a better year for Türkiye (Turkey).
1. A New Era in Turkish-American Relations Under President Trump
With the return of Donald Trump, a charismatic President who is different in every way and always the focus of media attention, to the Oval Office, there has been a noticeable shift in Turkish-American relations. During his first term as President, Donald Trump experienced some serious problems with Türkiye, such as the Pastor Brunson crisis, the S-400/F-35 issue, and disagreements over the future of the Kurds in Syria. He also sent a harsh letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which provoked a backlash within the country, reminiscent of the infamous “Johnson Letter“. However, in his second term, Trump earned praise for being more careful in his relations with Türkiye. From the day he was elected, Trump constantly flattered President Erdoğan, valuing him as one of the powerful right-wing leaders who had managed to dominate his country. He stated that he was not at all uncomfortable with Erdoğan at the helm of Türkiye and was pleased with the situation, which astonished opponents in Türkiye. In addition, Trump hosted Erdoğan at the White House in a grand, positive ceremony in late September 2025, demonstrating his desire to maintain good relations with Ankara and his trust in Erdoğan. As a result, contacts that had fallen to almost zero at the presidential level during the previous administration of President Joe Biden—although institutional relations had continued during that period—were strengthened and gained credibility through diplomatic exchanges between the leaders. In this way, President Erdoğan also enhanced his power and credibility in the international arena. It should be noted that following Erdoğan’s visit, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also held important meetings at the White House in November.
Despite these positive diplomatic interactions, it must also be said that problems between the two long-standing allies persist. Indeed, no final agreement has been reached between the two countries on the most serious issues, namely the future of Syria and the SDG Kurds, nor have Türkiye-Israel relations been repaired, nor has Türkiye been able to return the S-400 air defense system it purchased from Russia. In this context, it is possible to say that the structural problems continue unchanged. Moreover, these problems were compounded by tensions in relations at the rhetorical level due to Israel’s massacres in Gaza. Fortunately, as a result of President Trump’s diplomatic efforts, a ceasefire was achieved in Gaza towards the end of the year, reducing tensions somewhat. Additionally, during President Erdoğan’s visit to Washington, the commencement of energy cooperation between the two countries—which is a critical issue that could reduce Türkiye’s energy dependence on Russia—Türkiye’s contribution to the U.S. economy through substantial Boeing purchases, the agreement on reopening the Heybeliada Seminary, and the defense cooperation on the agenda can be highlighted as positive developments. The controversial statements made by Tom Barrack, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara and Special Representative for Syria, who has occasionally drawn criticism from nationalist and Islamist media in Türkiye due to his intriguing remarks, such as “There will be cooperation among American allies from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Türkiye and Israel will not go to war.” indicate that efforts to realign positions and negotiations on this matter are still ongoing. In this context, Türkiye’s decision to store the S-400s without activating them, thereby posing no risk to NATO and U.S. forces, and to fully support NATO missions, along with Türkiye’s support for reconciliation between Damascus and the Kurds in Syria and its stance on Syria’s stability and territorial integrity -Israel-U.S. triangle, reopening the investment taps of Washington and influential lobbies for Türkiye’s economic development, and preventing the formation of an anti-Türkiye front in the Eastern Mediterranean by the U.S. restraining Israel.
2. The Al-Shara Wind in Syria and the Fear of the SDF
One of the issues we focused on most in 2025 was the contacts between Islamist leader Ahmad al-Shara, who came to power in Syria in late 2024 through an unexpected revolution, and Türkiye. The visits of Turkish officials and Shara’s first official visit in February led to a noticeable increase in activity and progress in relations. In the following months, officials from both countries met in Washington and seemed to have reached an agreement on fundamental issues such as a new territorial integrity for Syria excluding the Golan Heights and Hatay, the resolution of internal conflicts through negotiation, Syria’s commitment to friendly and close relations with Türkiye in the new era, and the participation of the SDF, whose main component is the PKK, in the Syrian military force. However, it is still difficult to claim that an agreement has been reached on issues such as what kind of federal government will be established in Syria, under what conditions, for how long, and in what manner Türkiye’s military presence within the borders of this state will continue, and when and how elections will be held. Despite these problems, contrary to the prevailing media atmosphere, relations between the two countries are developing in a positive direction. The presence of individuals like Foreign Minister al-Shaybani (Asaad al-Shaybani), who received a university education in Türkiye, speaks fluent Turkish, and knows and loves Türkiye, in Shara’s cabinet clearly demonstrates the warm and open channels of dialogue between Damascus and Ankara. Türkiye is also expected to be one of the most important actors in Syria in this new era, focusing on the country’s development alongside Gulf countries. In this context, new contracts for Turkish firms, especially in the construction sector, may come to the fore.
3. The “Terror-Free Türkiye” Process
The most popular topic of 2025 was undoubtedly the positive and negative developments in the “Terror-Free (Terrorless) Türkiye” process, initiated in late 2024 by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Dr. Devlet Bahçeli, with the aim of getting the PKK to lay down its arms and strengthening the sense of belonging of Kurdish citizens to the state and nation. This process, supported by President Erdoğan in a historic speech, saw both positive and negative developments. While the MHP’s mature stance was generally supported by the pro-Kurdish DEM Party and the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP/AK Parti), it was clear that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) also did not want to obstruct the process. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the process is generally moving in a positive direction. However, the unnecessary debate and polarization surrounding whether the parliamentary delegation, composed of representatives from political parties in parliament, should visit İmralı Island to meet with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, shows that the process is still fragile. Despite everything, it can be said that the public is generally approaching this process maturely, and there is a general consensus, outside of far-right parties, that it should not be sabotaged. This is a strong signal for Türkiye’s bright future. Because in a developed, advanced, strong, and secure state that satisfies its citizens, terrorism cannot be expected to continue. In this context, it would be appropriate to view the process not as a victory or defeat, but as a technical and intelligence process that will ensure social peace.
4. Türkiye’s Economic Problems
The chronic problem that 2025 inherited from previous years, although somewhat reduced, remains economic, driven by high inflation and low real wages. While Mehmet Şimşek, a highly experienced and successful technocrat, has achieved partial success in this area, inflation in Türkiye, especially in the food sector, remains very high. In fact, while the official inflation rate announced by TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) is 31% – a very high rate – the ENAG group of independent academics calculated it to be around 57%. Although it is thought that Şimşek’s program may gradually achieve success in the next two years and inflation is projected to fall to single-digit levels by 2027, the significant decrease in the purchasing power of the people and the fact that those who have nothing to lose are now beginning to show their discontent in the streets indicates that the government will have a difficult time next year as well. In this sense, it is necessary to be prepared for problems such as social unrest, increased crime rates, and a clear rise in fraud, prostitution, and money laundering sectors. In addition to these, it is worth highlighting the positive developments: the Turkish economy is projected to rise to 16th place globally in terms of total gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.6 trillion. The fact that economic growth is expected to continue at around 4 percent is also a very positive development.
5. The Wind of Erhürman Blowing from the South
The warm winds of peace that Dr. Tufan Erhürman, a lawyer and academic who was elected as the 6th President of the TRNC with a clear margin in the elections held at the end of 2025, have been blowing from the south of Cyprus and have gradually begun to be noticed by the Turkish media and academia. Despite Türkiye’s apparent support for the 5th President Ersin Tatar during the election process, Erhürman, who made it clear from the beginning that he would work in harmony and coordination with Ankara, stated that progress could be achieved under the current conditions with the “two-state solution” thesis, which even the most friendly states to Türkiye did not support, and clearly indicated his openness to federation negotiations with the Greek Cypriots under the supervision of the United Nations. The influence of the TRNC President, who also conveyed this during his visit to Ankara, led to a noticeable softening in President Erdoğan’s harsh rhetoric on the Cyprus conflict. In this context, Ankara has demonstrated that it is never opposed to a peace process that addresses its national interests and security concerns, while simultaneously creating an opportunity to put the Greek Cypriots in a difficult position at the diplomatic table. Accordingly, if warmer winds blow on the island and conditions for peace are established, some positive progress could also be seen in Türkiye-European Union (EU) relations. For example, with incentives such as visa-free entry for Turkish citizens into the Schengen area, updating the Customs Union to include agricultural products and the service sector, and financial support from Brussels to Ankara, it is possible, in my opinion, for Ankara to give the green light to a federation in Cyprus in exchange for a certain degree of military presence and security guarantees. However, as always, it is foreseen that the Greek Cypriots will create the main problem and disrupt the negotiations at the final stage, as they have done before.
6. Judicial Interventions Against Opposition Leaders
The lawsuits and arrests of mayors, particularly those of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who stands as the strongest rival to President Erdoğan and is a member of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is leading in opinion polls, have created the worst possible image of Türkiye in the world in 2025. While this has led to the perception that the Turkish regime is oppressive and authoritarian, stifling opposition, President Erdoğan and the government have maintained that an independent judiciary is handling the process. CHP leader Özgür Özel, however, claimed that this process was politically motivated and that he mobilized millions of citizens to pro-democracy street protests through his rallies. Similarly, legal measures against DEM Party mayors and the provisional detention of some far-right political leaders, such as Victory Party leader Prof. Dr. Ümit Özdağ, have raised serious concerns and debates about the freedom of the political sphere in Türkiye. In addition, many opposition journalists and online programmers faced penalties, including arrest and imprisonment, during this process. In this context, the decline of democracy and the rule of law in Türkiye should be noted as a factor negatively affecting the economy.
7. Diplomacy Center Ankara
Following his meeting with President Trump, President Erdoğan, who has regained significant credibility in the Western world, hosted important political leaders in the capital, including UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer – whose visit secured the supply of Eurofighter aircraft, a necessity for Türkiye –, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Pope Leo XIV, Head of State of the Vatican, and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban. Türkiye’s winning the right to host the COP-31 summit also constitutes an important data set regarding Ankara’s diplomatic activity and successes. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF), which is now becoming a brand, should also be included in this success story. However, Türkiye’s exclusion from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, the increasingly deepening and militarized nature of the Greece-Southern Cyprus-Israel trio’s cooperation, and the support this trio receives from states like Lebanon in the East Mediterranean dispute have heightened concerns about the region and called into question Türkiye’s foreign policy. It is also necessary to mention current geopolitical and geo-economic risks, such as increasingly strained relations with Russia, potential problems with the U.S., the growing distance from the goal of EU membership, and erratic foreign policy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, as Türkiye, a powerful state, concludes 2025, having successfully maintained its active position in the world and the stability and strength embodied in the personality of President Erdoğan, risks and potentials remain equally present for the future. In this context, Ankara must improve/develop its relations with states with which it currently has problematic ties to mitigate risks and leverage its potential. Our only wish for 2026 is for our country to be more successful and to satisfy its citizens. The way to achieve this is through the establishment of an institutionalized and stable political and legal order, achieved through cooperation between the government and the opposition, the complete eradication of terrorism, and the establishment of friendly relations with all neighboring states that harbor no ill intentions. President Erdoğan possesses the knowledge and political power to achieve these goals.
Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ
